


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CONTENTS

ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

- New Arms Export Guidelines Allow Great Leeway
(DER SPIEGEL, 10 May 82)..... 1

FINLAND

- Karjalainen Sees Faster Economic Growth Next Year
(HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 6 Apr 82)..... 5
- Soviet Official Aims Long-Term Loan To Cover Trade Deficit
(HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 6 Apr 82)..... 7
- Unemployment, Vacations, Short Work Weeks Increase
(HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 6 Apr 82)..... 10
- Briefs
Soviet-Finnish Electronics Collaboration..... 12

FRANCE

- New Vehicle To Exploit Deep-Sea Nodules
(Claudine Meyer; L'USINE NOUVELLE, 11 Mar 82)..... 13

ITALY

- CGIL 1981 Final Balance Sheet Evaluated
(RASSEGNA SINDACALE, 8 Apr 82)..... 17
- Briefs
Trade Agreement With PRC..... 22

SPAIN

Foreign Investments Continue To Rise (ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA, 1 Apr 82).....	23
Recent Agreements With EC Listed (Ramon Rodriguez Lavin; ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA, 1 Apr 82)...	25
Shipbuilders Adopt Plan To Increase Productivity (Carmen Parra; YA, 13 Apr 82).....	28

TURKEY

Ozal Discusses Islamic Cooperation, Economy (ANATOLIA, 22 May 82).....	32
Results of Islamic Central Bank Governors Meeting Noted (Ankara Domestic Service, 23 May 82).....	33
Briefs IDB Agreements	35

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

Discussion on Ulusu Visit to Northern Cyprus (Resat Akar; GUNAYDIN, 18 May 82).....	36
Paper Sees Soviet Designs Behind Minimum Program (O AGON, 16 May 82).....	38

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Bahro Wants DKP Out of Peace Movement (DER SPIEGEL, 12 Apr 82).....	40
CDU's Geissler on Peace, Security Policy (Heiner Geissler; FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, 16 Apr 82).....	42
SPD Congress Outcome, Varying FDP Reactions (DER SPIEGEL, 26 Apr 82).....	48
Analysis of Causes, Remedies for SPD's Loss of Voters (Bernd Schoppe; VORWAERTS, 22 Apr 82).....	54
FDP, SPD Becoming Further Estranged in Hesse (DER SPIEGEL, 10 May 82).....	60

FINALND

Briefs	
Youth Organization Defection	63
FRANCE	
Role of PSF-PCF Ties, Opposition Clubs Examined (Pierre Thibon; LE FIGARO, 1-2 Mar 82).....	64
GREECE	
FRG Working To Defuse Greek-Turkish Tension (V. P. Mathiopoulos; TO VIMA, 18 May 82).....	71
Pasok Paper Criticizes KKE on Campaign Against Government (EXORMISI, 16 May 82).....	72
Paper Scores Communists' Anti-Haig Stance (Potis Paraskevopoulos; ELEVTHEROTIPIA, 17 May 82).....	74
'I KATHIMERINI' on Inconsistency in PASOK Foreign Policy (Editorial; I KATHIMERINI, 16 May 82).....	76
'TO VIMA' on U.S. Guarantees of Greek Border (Editorial; TO VIMA, 14 May 82).....	77
Briefs	
Government Policy on AWACS Rapped	79
NETHERLANDS	
New VVD Parliamentary Leader Nijpels Profiled (ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE, 1 May 82).....	80
Interview on Plans, by Rene de Bok Assessment of Abilities	
PORTUGAL	
PCP Spokesman Discusses Cooperation With PS (Blanqui Teixeira Interview; O JORNAL, 23 Apr 82).....	89
Potential Electoral Gains of PS Analyzed (Paulo Portas; TEMPO, 15 Apr 82).....	95
Falkland Situation Compared to Gibraltar, Ceuta, Melilla Problems (Luis Solana; EL PAIS, 7 May 82).....	99

ETA Action Intimidates Nuclear Plant Employees (Rosa Montero; EL PAIS, 9 May 82).....	101
TURKEY	
Haig Visit to Turkey, Greece Evaluated (CUMURIYET, 15 May 82, TERCUMAN, 17 May 82).....	106
Haig Visits Turkey Ankara, Athens Visit, by Fahir Armaoglu	
Columnist Scores European Meeting in East Jerusalem (Fahir Armaoglu; TERCUMAN, 19 May 82).....	109
MILITARY	
CYPRUS	
Paper Suspicious of Army Commander's Appointment (I SIMERINI, 16 May 82).....	111
FRANCE	
PSF Proposals for Military Compared to Communist Book (Georges Rieu; LE FIGARO MAGAZINE, 3-9 Apr 82).....	112

NEW ARMS EXPORT GUIDELINES ALLOW GREAT LEEWAY

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 10 May 82 pp 19-21

[Article: "'Now the Door Is Wide Open'"]

[Text] The new guidelines for the export of arms leave the Federal Government a lot of leeway. Henceforth German arms can be sold and sent anywhere in the world, including areas of tension. Even tank deliveries to the Saudis, which foundered on SPD opposition a year ago, would be covered by the flexible language.

When shooting broke out in the South Atlantic, the solidarity of the Bonn government with its friends in London vanished quickly.

An upset cabinet discussed the situation in the Falkland conflict Wednesday of last week [5 May]. The British, declared Defense Minister Hans Apel, had proceeded with extreme brutality in their air attacks on the airport of Port Stanley. The Federal chancellor, no admirer of Margaret Thatcher as it is, according to one participant indulged in "bitter words" about the stubbornness of the prime minister.

In time-tested fashion the Federal foreign minister used the crisis for hectic diplomatic activities. Several times last week Hans-Dietrich Genscher telephoned his British counterpart, Francis Pym, and U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig. Thursday he met Pym for 90 minutes at London airport.

The nervousness of the people in Bonn is understandable. Their motives for urging a quick end to the hostilities are not just selfless.

Unexpectedly the undeclared war over the Falkland Islands had made it clear just what kind of dilemma the SPD-FDP government had got itself into. Because it had generously approved arms sales to Argentina in the past, it suddenly, without wanting to, had been drawn into a hot dispute, for Bonn has been one of the leading suppliers of the Argentine military regime who have armed it systematically for years.

The Exocet missile which hit the destroyer Sheffield and made it go up in flames is equipped with a homing warhead by Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm which

approaches its target on its own and is virtually immune against electronic interference signals.

The only Argentine warships which dared enter the zone of exclusion around the Falkland Islands were the two 1,285-ton submarines Salta and San Luis. These had been built at Howaldt's in Kiel. Their specialty: They can operate in shallow depths and, because they are extremely silent, are difficult to locate.

Blohm + Voss in Hamburg is building four frigates for Argentina and, in addition, the parts for six corvettes which the Argentines assemble at home. The Thyssen-Nordseewerke are participating with orders for two submarines and supplies for another four. The total value of the warship business in behalf of General Galtieri: DM 4 billion.

What is at stake for the shipyards becomes apparent by the following comparison: In 1979 the total arms exports of the Federal Republic, including NATO countries, amounted to 1.5 billion; the portion of the "special shipbuilding" (the bashful designation of the war production) is 1.3 billion.

While the Federal Government stopped all arms deliveries to the South American military on 7 April, 5 days after the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands, it carefully avoided doing what it would have been authorized to do in accordance with the war arms control law--revoking the licenses for building the ships. It was motivated by economic reasons: if hostilities continue for a while, making it impossible for the completed ships to be delivered, the consequences for the West German shipyard industry, which is in difficulties as it is, are unfathomable.

So Blohm + Voss, undaunted, is continuing working on the frigates destined for Argentina. "Why should we let the ax fall?" asks an employee of the company.

Why indeed? After all, the British are helping to build the Argentine naval force. Currently several dozen British specialists are employed in the building of the frigates at the Hamburg shipyard, equipping the Argentine warships with technology made in Great Britain.

In this situation of all things (no critic of the armament industry could have imagined a more ominous one), the Office of the Chancellor on Monday of last week [3 May] issued the new guidelines for arms exports.

For a year and a half the people in Bonn time and again had given assurances that they intended to restrict the sale of war materiel to countries outside NATO to a minimum. Alarmed by the authorization for building two submarines for Chile and the Saudi desire for the "Leopard II," the SPD and FDP Bundestag deputies appointed committees with the task of drafting as restrictive provisions as possible.

Yet what the government has passed now is not closing but opening loopholes. The new guidelines are intriguing primarily by their seemingly precise but in fact highly flexible language, which makes just about anything possible.

While the people in Bonn have given assurances that they would adhere to the "proven" reserve, in actuality (as Kiel SPD Deputy Norbert Gansel puts it) the SPD-FDP government now has "pushed the door for arms exports wide open."

The SPD deputy is not alone. Helmut Schmidt is having trouble with the comrades as a result of the publication of the guidelines in the middle of the Falkland crisis and only 10 days after the SPD party congress in Munich had resolved to restrict arms exports.

In the Bundestag the government will have to answer some embarrassing questions this week. SPD parliamentarians such as Gansel, Uwe Lambinus and Horst Jungmann want detailed information about the extent of the flourishing arms deals.

Not only Argentina is at the very top of the list of customers. The Howaldtwerke-Deutsche Werft at present are welding together two corvettes for Malaysia. In addition the Far Eastern country has ordered 100 armored vehicles in the Federal Republic. The value of the not yet authorized order: DM 500 million.

Authorization would set a precedent, for as yet no armored vehicles have been sold to a country outside NATO. If the new guidelines are applied, however, there is hardly any reason for prohibiting delivery.

The guidelines say that exports may take place whenever "foreign policy and security police interests of the Federal Republic of Germany, taking into account alliance interests," so "indicate." This condition is easily fulfilled. Malaysia is being governed more or less democratically and belongs to the ASEAN Pact, which cooperates closely with the European Community. "So why not?" asked Manfred Lahnstein, then still head of the Office of the Chancellor, as long as several weeks ago.

In coming up with this rubber formula the government did not shrink from tricks "which would be worthy of a shyster" (Gaensel).

The SPD committee chaired by Egon Bahr had recommended that sales take place only if "required" by "vital foreign policy and security policy interests." Though using the proposal, the government drafters edited it carefully, declaring "all" foreign policy and security policy interests to be vital and weakening "require" by substituting "indicate."

The authorization formula turned out to be so cotton soft that tanks for Saudi Arabia could also be reconciled with it--in other words, the planned deal which triggered the call for stricter export guidelines in the first place.

There is a method in the combination of strong words and weak intentions. Seemingly strict, the government decided that "the supply of war materiel must not contribute to heightening existing tensions." In plain language this means that, contrary to what has been true in the past, already existing tensions no longer militate against exports.

As for joint armament projects with NATO partners, the guidelines are even more lax. If individual parts or building component groups are assembled elsewhere

into a finished weapons system, "the processing in the partner country predi-
cates a new place of origin of the goods as far as permission to export is
concerned."

A hammer blow kind of logic: a German gun ceases to be one if it is built into
a howitzer in Great Britain and then sold to Saudi Arabia.

As it is, the government "as a matter of principle" attaches "priority to the
interest of cooperation" over the control of exports. Since Bonn cannot dictate
to the British, Italians and French what their armament export policy should be,
this means virtually a universal release.

The Germans' right to have a say is reduced to a remnant which is good only for
washing one's hands of the matter; consultation proceedings are to "make it
possible" for the government "to raise objections." Paris is likely to be im-
pressed if it comes to building a German-French battle tank!

The chancellor did make the concession of consulting the parliament in the
future in case of delicate arms sales. In a letter to the leaders of the
deputies of all three parties in the Bundestag, Schmidt promised that, with one
expert each, they could participate in the decisive meetings of the Federal
Security Council.

By making this concession, the chancellor hopes to receive an early warning in
the event there is trouble ahead, as happened late in 1980 when the authorization
to build the submarines for Chile became known.

It appears doubtful, however, whether the parliamentarians will be strong enough
to raise any objections even when their veto, as in the shipyard industry, would
jeopardize jobs.

Already the SPD parliamentary committee has seen its way clear to conceding that
the export of warships "at this time cannot (be tied) to the general narrow
guidelines for the export of war materiel." At Howaldt's in Kiel, for example,
in the South Works, "security policy considerations require maintaining the
production capacity even when this capacity can be insured only by exporting
submarines to countries outside NATO."

In case of doubt, this is a guarantee that business will continue to flourish,
for ships constitute more than 90 percent of German armament exports.

Only the opposition is showing pleasure at the good work of the SPD and FDP.
"A CDU/CSU government," says a man from the CSU, "will not have to change an
iota in these guidelines, because they contain an enormous amount of possibili-
ties. It is for this reason that we kept silent; all we could have done is to
praise the paper."

8790

CSO: 3103/465

KARJALAINEN SEES FASTER ECONOMIC GROWTH NEXT YEAR

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 6 Apr 82 p 31

[Article: "Director General Ahti Karjalainen of the Bank of Finland: Economic Growth To Accelerate Next Year"]

[Text] Finland cannot yet in 1982 expect any increase in the rate of economic revival, according to Ahti Karjalainen, director general of the Bank of Finland. If there is any increase at all, it could not at best exceed 0.2 percent.

Karjalainen stated that the Bank of Finland estimates the growth rate for 1983 at about 1.5 percent. Referring to the uncertain prospects in international economics, however, Karjalainen pointed out that "the prediction is made on a most uncertain basis."

According to Karjalainen, Finland can have hope of more rapid growth during 1984-85. Speaking on the basis of studies conducted at the Bank of Finland concerning Finland's economic progress and the part played in it by Soviet trade, Karjalainen noted that the gross national product is expected to grow at an annual rate of four to five percent during those years. Karjalainen's estimate of the speed-up in the rate of growth is more pessimistic than certain other recent predictions. Many of the predictions anticipate an upturn in the growth rate even at the end of 1982.

"There are no certain indications that the upturn could begin in 1982. Such optimistic estimates obviously exist largely on the basis of wishful thinking," Karjalainen noted.

The slow economic growth can be attributed directly to unemployment. The unemployment rate for 1982 has been estimated at 6.7 percent. Karjalainen estimates the 1983 rate to exceed eight percent which would mean unemployed of more than 200,000. In 1984 the figure is expected to drop to around 7 to 7.5 percent.

Karjalainen was quite hopeful with respect to the foreign trade balance in the Finnish economy. He predicts a favorable surplus in the trade balance of about a half a billion markkas at the end of 1982. A surplus of a billion markkas is expected for 1983.

With a possible speed-up in the rate of growth in 1984, a shortfall of about a billion markkas is expected in the balance of trade, "which is normally associated with an increasing rate of economic growth in an open economy, such as prevails in Finland."

The exchange factor that measures the ratio between export and import prices will improve by about four percent during 1982, according to Karjalainen, and perhaps by an additional one percent in 1983.

5955

CSO: 3107/104

SOVIET OFFICIAL AIRS LONG-TERM LOAN TO COVER TRADE DEFICIT

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 6 Apr 82 p 31

[Article: "Cures Sought for Imbalance in Trade With East; A Portion of Finland's Surplus as a Long-Term Loan"]

[Text] The imbalance in trade between Finland and the Soviet Union may currently be acting as a brake, but the trade situation is controllable on a long-term basis. That was the assurance given at the 2-day seminar dealing with prospects for developing economic and trade collaboration between Finland and the Soviet Union that opened 5 April at Finlandia House in Helsinki.

In addition to promoting increased Soviet imports, the surplus trade accruing in Finland's favor can in the future be balanced by converting some of the present surplus into a long-term loan.

The Soviet Union has additional machinery and equipment to offer to Finland in addition to the electrical energy that it currently exports to Finland. Soviet experts in particular are promoting increased export of natural gas along with increased oil exports.

In addition to the first-class experts in this sector from both countries, practically all of the Finnish firms that trade with the East participated in this seminar, which was organized by the Finnish trade journal KAUPPALEHTI and the Soviet EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA.

The imbalance in the trade between Finland and the Soviet Union amounts to about 3 billion markkas in Finland's favor at this time. The reduction of this disparity will be the subject of negotiation when Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade A.N. Manzuholo and his staff arrive in Finland at the end of April 1982.

A speedy increase in imports from the Soviet Union has recently been proposed for the attainment of parity so as to avoid a cut in exports that would sorely hurt Finland. The possibility of converting the present imbalance into a loan may also be raised in the forthcoming discussions in Helsinki.

Should the alternative of the loan be adopted, then the interest rate on it would also need to be determined. Dr Ahti Karjalainen, Finnish chairman of the Finnish-Soviet Economic Commission, did not wish to conjecture about that. He did point out, however, that in the future Finland could find itself paying the interest in the event that the surplus turns into a shortfall for Finland. According to Assistant State Secretary Ake Wihtol, the present imbalance did not come into being with unexpected rapidity. "There is no need now to be overly concerned about the present situation but rather to seek to level out the imbalance, possibly over a 3-year period," he said.

Imbalance Partially Exaggerated

"There is also a need to point out that the true imbalance is smaller than the financial statement of the Bank of Finland appears to indicate. The size of the present clearinghouse credit due to Finland is governed by a number of factors, such as the payments of an advance nature associated with shipping and projected exports that will later be covered by actual deliveries of goods. The trade balance and the payments balance are therefore partially different matters," Wihtol points out.

Natural Gas To Offer

According to Deputy Director Yuri Piskulov of the Soviet Administration for Western Foreign Trade Relations, they are seeking to correct the shortfall that has occurred between the countries primarily by means of increased energy exports and by deliveries of machines and equipment. In addition to the oil exports, the Soviet Union wishes in particular to increase its exports of natural gas to Finland. This was also pointed out by Deputy Foreign Trade Minister N.N. Smelyakov. Piskulov believes that new exports to Finland can be found among various chemicals and certain metals. Agreement has already been achieved in respect to increased wood quotas.

Piskulov believes that although the trade imbalance may at this time hinder the starting of new projects in the Soviet Union by Finns, the situation is under control in the longer term. "The present discrepancy does not present an obstacle to the developing of actual trade," says Piskulov.

Light Industry to Kostamus

In addition to the major projects currently under way, there still are, according to Piskulov, possibilities for Finnish construction firms to obtain small contracts, for instance in the Kostamus area.

The Finns have also been negotiating to supply machines and equipment for Soviet meat and fish processing plants.

The possibility exists for Finnish participation in the establishment of a consumer goods industry in Kostamus. The construction of agricultural implement repair shops by Finns has also been under consideration.

Nordic Collaboration

Soviet plans for the exploitation of energy reserves from its arctic areas have already generated some equipment orders for Finnish firms. According to Piskulov, the Soviet Union is hoping that Finland will in the future participate in this so-called arctic project along with other Nordic countries.

Piskulov also reiterated the idea that he expressed at the signing of the agreement on the exchange of goods between the countries in December 1981, namely, that the Pohjoismaiden Investointipankki ought to be induced to participate in the financing of the venture.

5955

CSO: 3107/104

UNEMPLOYMENT, VACATIONS, SHORT WORK WEEKS INCREASE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 6 Apr 82 p 31

[Article: "Spring Brings More Layoffs"]

[Excerpt] The difficulties that the sawmills, the wallboard factories and the textile mills are currently experiencing are apparent in the street scenes in industrial communities. Many firms are laying off personnel this week and next. Some firms are converting to a shortened work week for the remainder of the spring. The number of layoffs has not decreased during the spring. New layoffs occur daily.

The general picture in Helsinki is slightly brighter, with relatively fewer layoffs than elsewhere in the country. The Helsinki labor district had 1,657 persons on a shortened work week during March 1982 and 1,798 on vacation. Nearly all of these were construction workers.

The employment situation in the Turku area, which already has been in a depressed condition, is being worsened by the decrease in the export of textiles and clothing goods to the Soviet Union.

The decreased exports to the Soviet Union are expected to cause reduced employment in the textiles industry in the Turku labor district which could become a permanent reduction in the labor force. The administration there estimates that, at worst, the Turku area textiles industry could lose 3,000 jobs. A decrease of at least 1,000 jobs can be expected during 1982 according to even the most cautious estimates.

At the end of February 1982, the Turku labor district had 2,887 persons on vacation and 1,781 on a shortened work week.

The Pori labor district had 1,141 persons on vacation at the end of February 1982. For the Pori district, that figure is high, because in all of 1981 it had a total of only 365 on vacation.

The Pori area had 404 workers on a shortened work week during February 1982 compared with 253 a year ago. The shortened work week continued to increase during March, but vacation time remained unchanged.

The Rosenlew bag factory had 50 workers on vacation during the week of 4 April, but the situation is improving as a result of new orders. The Rosenlew Seikun Saha sawmill has 160 workers on vacation on alternate weeks. All 160 workers of the Rosenlew foundry are on a shortened week, but the situation is expected to improve in the foundry in the near future.

5955

CSO: 3107/104

BRIEFS

SOVIET-FINNISH ELECTRONICS COLLABORATION--The possibilities of expanding industrial collaboration between Finland and the Soviet Union in the field of modern technology was under consideration during the visit by Deputy Premier N.V. Talyzin at the Nokia electronics center in Espoo. As part of the observances of the 34th anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Collaboration, Minister Talyzin familiarized himself with the results of the industrial collaboration in the production of communications equipment that was undertaken on his initiative. The Nokia firm has had a collaborative agreement with the Minsk plant of Soviet Ministry of Communications. It was noted in the discussions between Minister Talyzin and Operations Manager Kari Kairamo that the industrial collaboration is progressing in an especially favorable fashion. The possibility of extending the collaboration into other electronic fields also touched on. Under consideration were the possibilities opened by the industrial collaboration for extending markets into third countries. Minister Talyzin made a speedy tour of the nuclear generating plant at Loviisa on 3 April 1982. Because of Minister Talyzin's tight schedule, Doctor of Technology Anders Palmgren conducted a full tour of the plant in a time that must approach an all-time high for speed. Palmgren first made a general presentation of the plant at the information building and then explained the training simulator at the personnel training center. He then took the visitors through the Loviisa I plant, including the reactor corridor, in less than 50 minutes, which required a brisk pace. The time record for the plant tour, however, remains at 45 minutes with a high-level visitor from Luxembourg. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 7 Apr 82 p 10] 5955

CSO: 3107/104

NEW VEHICLE TO EXPLOIT DEEP-SEA NODULES

Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French Supplement to No 11, 11 Mar 82 pp 8-9

[Article by Claudine Meyer: "Nodules: Heavyweights of the Sea"]

[Text] Nodules, the fabled mineral deposits lying 6,000 meters below the surface, are challenging technology. To explore for them, France has entered the race with Vera I, a 100-ton apparatus which is expected to harvest 3 million tons a year.

This choice goes back 2 years. The minister of industry at that time opted for the original solution proposed by the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) and the France-Dunkirk Shipyards: a system of unmanned autonomous sampling shuttle vehicles (PLA). The devices were expected to be the length of a railroad car (24 meters), some 13 meters wide, and 8 meters high! Weighted during descent by 300 tons of sterile mineral substances, these 1,000-ton vehicles of the ocean were supposed to harvest 250 tons of polymetallic nodules, gathered with the help of a dragnet.

These famous nodules are nothing more than large stones, 3 to 6 centimeters in diameter. Formed of concentric beds of metallic oxides deposited around a sometimes microscopic nucleus, they contain varying proportions of manganese, iron, nickel, copper, cobalt, and, more rarely, molybdenum or titanium. The race is readily understandable! Recovering 3 million nodules per year would assure our entire consumption of nickel, three times our needs for cobalt, twice those for manganese, and 10 percent of our copper requirements. Other harvesting techniques envisaged in other countries are dredging by means of scoops attached to a cable, or by pumps using a suction device 20 meters wide with a pipe connected to the surface. This latter device would cover a 5,000-meter-wide area of the ocean. Not very easy!

In France, the various partners of AFERNOD (French Association for the Research and Study of Polymetallic Nodules), created 1 October 1974, were sharing the responsibility. Already in 1970, the major [partner], CNEXO (National Center for Ocean Development) had begun to work 5 million kilometers at a depth of 5,000 meters in the Pacific Ocean. An autonomous recognition device, moreover, was developed by the ECA Corporation in collaboration with CNEXO. Under remote control by an acoustical system, it can hedgehop over the ocean floor at depths of up to 6,000 meters, all the while taking still and moving pictures.

The second giant of the group--CEA--and its nuclear testing centers at Grenoble, Saclay, and Fontenay-aux-Roses are studying the problems of mine management and of industrial shuttles, the form of submarine devices and their support systems, and, finally, the idea of a factory ship in which the nodules would undergo preliminary refining.

From Sketches to Testing

With a third partner, the Nickel Corporation, CEA has been working to place a value on the metals contained in the nodules, hydrometallurgic procedures (amonia- and sulfur-based) for CEA, pyrometallurgic for Nickel.

Finally, CEA has given the task of creating the shuttles to the only construction company which is a member of AFERNOD--the France-Dunkirk Ship-years--reserving in the future the responsibility for surface support (receiving and storing the nodules) to the quasi-energy firm CG-Doris.

The first problems for the France-Dunkirk Shipyards are how to position and propel these "heavy vehicles" on the unstable and non-cohesive soil at the bottom of the sea. Below a depth of 3,000 meters, present submarine devices cannot support themselves on that type of soil base. There is a total lack of experience in that area.

At the Research Center for Marine Sedimentology at Perpignan, the first tests in the ponds of Salses near Port Barcares were abandoned because of their remoteness from any industrial zone and because of the summer visit of the famous Canadair, which took their water reserves.

Thus it was that the France-Dunkirk Shipyards set up their testing center at Dunkirk around an old, little-used drydock. Cost of the operation: 1 million francs. "Contrary to the usual process, which consists of dredging the bottom of the area, we laid down 4,000 square meters of sludge (gathered at the port) to a thickness of 3 meters, and the entire bed was covered with sand to a depth of 20 centimeters," explained Jean-Pierre Moreau, director of the technical/economic group of the research and development department of the France-Dunkirk Shipyards, which is responsible for the testing and development of the "shuttle" program. With the reconstitution of this sedimentary bed, which shifts like the floor of the deepest [ocean], the program has progressed from drawing board to testing: the tests aim principally at the immersion of a truck with two Archimedean screws which anticipate one of the four "wheels" of the future shuttle, and the lifting machine which will make up the chassis.

At the edge of the basin, all the measuring equipment will be installed to analyze the screws' yield, the energy characteristics and the "marketability" of the submerged apparatuses, their displacement speed, their capability to glide on the sand, and their axial load. From these results they can correct the screw net, optimize propulsion, and review the problem of lift in the apparatus in case of quicksand.... "You can compare the shuttle to an airplane which descends like a glider and climbs using powerful reactors," summarizes Jean-Pierre Moreau.

On the drawing board, the team will simultaneously attack the problems of mastering the machine's trajectory, the dredging, transfer, and warehousing systems, and the problem of ballast (it might be possible to use either sand with gravel added, gravel, or pure sand).

Another theme for research: What will the shuttle be made of? The final design of the apparatus should include a metal body "dressed" in plastic foam for floatability, with plastic cables. The France-Dunkirk Shipyards have joined with the National Gunpowder and Explosives Society to study the resistance of these materials which are so difficult to use for large machines.

Three Million Tons of Nodules per Year

For its supply of energy, the vehicle will be equipped with an electric-gel battery placed in a container, but the solution to the ultimate problem remains unanswered: the shuttle's consumption of 1,300 kilowatts of energy in real terms.

In 1983, the experimental vehicle PLA 2 will be the synthesis of various ideas developed for gathering the nodules and propelling the shuttle. But with a weight of 12 tons and a capacity of less than 200 kilos of nodules, we are far from the gigantic device which will ultimately be used....

"This first robot of the ocean depths, submerged in the Mediterranean and then in the Pacific, must first demonstrate whether it is possible to submerge a shuttle 6,000 meters, position it on soft ground, and bring it back to the surface," Jean-Pierre Moreau considers. It must be added, though, that to prove the practicality of industrial development the PLA 2 will then have to pass the baton to a new and smaller design based on the original industrial pilot design.

A Vera I apparatus of about 100 tons, capable of having a carrying capacity of 10 percent (a submarine can carry only 4-5 percent of its weight) should be ready between 1985 and 1988 if the French project responds satisfactorily for the Ministry of Industry. The project's final form will have a gathering capacity of 3 million tons of nodules annually.

Satisfaction at the technical level, satisfaction with the budget: Compared to the American budget, French expenses, borne principally by the government, are "prudent" (82 million francs this year, although only 200 million have been spent since 1970). "Of course," concludes Jean-Pierre Moreau, "the Americans are ahead of us, but the gathering technique adopted by France allows a graduated investment a total of 6 billion francs will be necessary), whereas the American choice requires large sums at the outset."

Furthermore, in the short term, the graduated steps of the research stage should bring interesting spinoffs to each of the AFERNOD partners, notably in the area of subsurface activities. It was that notion which made the France-Dunkirk Shipyards, in their search for diversification, put nearly 10 million francs in the kitty during the past five years.

France Is Well Placed in the Race to Harvest Sea Nodules

At the end of 1981, while waiting for the international agreement being debated by the United Nations Conference on Maritime Law to go into effect, France adopted a "temporary" law on the exploitation of mineral resources located at great depths. With a technology habitually in second place behind the Americans, France has just caught up with the United States, West Germany, and Great Britain in this competition--a competition which requires rigorous controls, in light of the political and economic problems which this type of research raises on a worldwide scale: the polymetallic nodules fields which lie at a depth of 5,000 meters, spread over an area of 450,000 square kilometers in the northern Pacific Ocean, between the Clipperton and Clarion faults, have considerable amounts of copper, cobalt, manganese, and nickel.... all the minerals we lack, as well as those which are the lifeblood of the Third World countries. An aid fund, augmented by a tax of 3.75 percent of the value of the nodules, will be allocated to these countries.

Six international consortia have appeared. AFERMOD for France, one totally Japanese group, and four predominantly American ones: Kennecott Copper; the Ocean Mining Association, which attempted to develop an airlift-gathering procedure (but which broke down after 18 hours of operation); Ocean Management Inc., which also raised several tons of nodules, some by airlift, some by hydraulic pumps; and the Ocean Mineral Company, whose apparatus sank at a great depth after harvesting 1,000 tons of nodules.

9803

CSO: 3100/507

CGIL 1981 FINAL BALANCE SHEET EVALUATED

Rome RASSEGNA SINDACALE in Italian 8 Apr 82 pp 42-44

[Text] Rome, 31 March 1982--This report should be carefully evaluated by our organization, because what looked like mere indications of trends in the 1980 budget were consolidated and became consistent in 1981.

We have had increasing financial difficulties due to rapidly increasing expenditures, due partly to the depreciation of the currency and higher costs of budget items that are essential for the life of the trade union, and partly to the difficulty in collecting all receipts, 90 percent of which come from the issuing of membership cards and the allocation of receipts from members' dues. In some regions, especially in the South (Calabria, Sardegna, Puglia, Campania and Basilicata; also Lazio), these trends have reached crisis proportions.

The issuing of membership cards was as follows as of the end of 1981:

-100,508 cards in productive sectors;

+ 82,503 cards for retired members.

These data merit careful consideration, as they obviously have more than administrative effects.

Card issuing for 1981 resulted in a drop in receipts for the budget of a temporary and not very alarming nature, but they are indicative of a trend: a decline (- 0.2 percent) in membership, especially of active workers, not completely offset by increased membership of retirees, is a precise signal which should be taken into account at all times in our activities. On the other hand the organization department, which was established after the congress, took up the problem of card issuing and recruitment as a priority matter. Proposals have been made which have already been forwarded to all the territorial and category structures; others will be added to them in the coming weeks within the framework of the present evaluation of organizational problems at the regional and interregional level, so we will limit ourselves to a discussion of the administrative side of this issue.

Under the credit side, we note the shortfall which gives the most cause for concern and is least acceptable politically: receipts from trade union dues.

These did not reach the estimated 2.85 billion, and this makes it difficult for the confederation's headquarters to support regions with problems.

Expenditures for the 1981 budget are within estimated limits. For the sake of clarity, we will give a detailed explanation of the various expenditures.

General expenses reflect an increase in general costs and higher prices (lights, telephone, maintenance) than were estimated; expenditures for staff also exceeded the estimates, due to contingency expenses that were much higher than the estimates, and also to refunds and seniority contributions, which brought the cost of personnel to 30 percent of the budget. This amount is considerable but not excessive. It should be noted in this connection that work at the confederation's headquarters is being organized on a different basis: it is expected that staff will be reduced by at least 10 percent during 1982. Nevertheless, personnel-related expenses are expected to remain very high compared to other budget items in 1982 because of termination pay and insurance refunds stemming from the progressive staff reduction planned.

Expenses for political organizational activities were within the estimates, but the section on political organizational solidarity deserves special mention. It is undoubtedly the most complex part of the budget, and the hardest to administer, even though receipts for rebalancing have been managed very wisely so far.

Dues paid to regional offices, especially in the South, amounted to the considerable sum of 1,558,364,550 lire, to which 439,485,000 lire should be added for structures, zones and categories of the Mezzogiorno [South].

Thus there is cause for concern, and the 1982 situation requires attention. At present we foresee a worsening of situations requiring rebalancing, as there are signs of difficulties even in structures usually free of financial troubles.

The special committee on financing will be called upon to do delicate and difficult work, which we hope will produce effective and satisfactory results for the organization as a whole. It will require the right relationship between the confederation's headquarters, the district and regional horizontal structures and all the category federations: a relationship based on knowledge of real budgets, staff data, termination pay, etc. Only this specific knowledge will make it possible to design a more equitable solidarity policy, which would not merely cover deficits but sustain effective financial recovery plans.

Expenditures for trade union training are lower than in preceding years. For section 6, on the other hand--press and propaganda--a careful analysis and evaluation is needed which cannot be adequately presented here. "Press" expenditures are for the purchase of foreign newspapers and journals. We think it is possible to rationalize these expenditures. It is the view of the secretariat that each department should weigh its real needs and use the means at its disposal better.

Another item regards propaganda. Confederation headquarters contributed more than 250 million to support subscriptions. A plan is now being developed to reconsider the manner and type of press and information the trade union should have, not just at the national level; this also concerns the verification of the United Federation's own press and information.

Section 7 (investment and immovables) includes an expenditure for the replacement of two armored cars; the proceeds for the sale of used ones to Alfa Romeo have not yet been collected.

The other sections are in line with estimates. The only point requiring clarification is in section 10: office investments. This is an entry of 900 million for a special office fund which is self-contained.

In concluding this brief review of the final 1981 budget, it should be said that the secretariat and the confederation's governing bodies must adopt valid and uniform expenditure criteria for the organization as a whole aimed, basically, at the achievement of self-sufficiency for every structure and at the identification of ways of finding funds to achieve this objective.

It is natural that an organization like ours, which has gone through financially difficult moments in the past, should adopt spending criteria based on the need to economize on management expenditures, and, if possible, save.

We must acquire a better ability to make medium- and long-term estimates; there should be more attention to detail and less improvising in the economic management of the organization's structures at all levels.

Rigorous budgets should become points of reference the organization's whole financial policy is based on, rather than accounting obligations which are more or less technically correct.

Final 1981 CGIL Budget

Receipts

1) For membership cards	6,573,762,750 lire
2) Subscriptions, refunds, payments for attendance tokens, interest on bank balances	424,992,229 "
3) Trade union dues	2,398,600,421 "
4) Unexpected assets and miscellaneous	33,958,070 "

Expenditures

Section 1

General Expenses

1) Maintenance, heating, lighting at headquarters	178,981,411 "
2) Mail and telephone	125,820,830 "
3) Maintenance of office machines and vehicles	58,209,626 "

4) Stationery and printing expenses	39,997,007	lire
5) Printing and shipping tickets	75,236,034	"
6) Bank expenses	2,596,573	"
7) Legal and diverse insurance	30,375,040	
8) Bad debts and unexpected liabilities	32,609,817	"
	<u>543,826,338</u>	lire

Section 2

Expenses for Staff, Headquarters and United Federation

1) Salaries, compensation and collaboration	2,108,749,107	lire
2) Social expenses	660,951,213	"
3) Pension fund	377,686,407	"
	<u>3,147,386,727</u>	lire

Section 3

Political Organizational Activities

1) Expenses for internal meetings	254,275,811	lire
2) Expenses for meetings at headquarters	11,948,650	"
3) International activities and dues to ETUC [European Trade Union Confederation]	200,754,097	"
4) National conventions	34,509,957	"
5) Solidarity and unexpected	38,524,525	"
6) Data processing equipment	25,490,320	"
	<u>565,503,360</u>	lire

Section 4

Political-Organizational Solidarity

1) For central and northern structures, zones and categories	190,035,019	lire
2) For southern structures, zones and categories	439,485,000	"
3) National federations	76,200,000	"
4) Regional	1,558,364,550	"
5) Office arrangements	1,708,400	"
6) Contributions to various organizations	85,723,500	"
7) Contributions to areas struck by earthquakes	100,000,000	"
	<u>2,451,516,469</u>	lire

Section 5

1) Training and Ariccia school	266,523,700	lire
2) Contribution for management	61,893,006	"
	<u>328,416,706</u>	lire

Section 6

1) Press and propaganda	46,213,565 lire
2) Newspapers, journals	72,602,386 "
3) ESI subscriptions	<u>356,057,488 "</u>
	474,873,439 lire

Section 7

Investment and Immovables

1) Purchases of office furniture and machines	26,570,943 lire
2) Purchases of vehicles	80,000,000 "
3) Telex	<u>20,951,850 "</u>
	127,522,793 lire

Section 8

United CGIL-CISL-UIL Federation

1) Dues	104,500,000 lire
2) Diverse activities	<u>1,822,800 "</u>
	106,322,800 lire

Section 9

IRES [Research Institute of the CGIL]

1) Compensation and contributions	381,139,276 lire
2) Rental of libraries, cleaning, telephone, lights	93,217,485 "
3) Meetings and conventions	83,393,208 "
4) Subscriptions to newspapers and books	22,279,902 "
5) Furniture and various machines	31,428,353 "
6) Diverse research	<u>29,301,950 "</u>
	640,760,174 lire

Section 10

Diverse and Special

1) Tenth congress	412,492,429 lire
2) Office investments	<u>916,835,600 "</u>
	1,329,328,029 lire

Total receipts	9,431,313,470 lire	
Total expenditures		9,715,456,835 lire
1981 operational deficit	<u>284,143,365 "</u>	
	9,715,456,835 lire	9,715,456,835 lire

9855

CSO: 3104/188

BRIEFS

TRADE AGREEMENT WITH PRC--Beijing, 15 May (ANSA)--A package of trade agreements with a compositive value of close to 400 million dollars was signed between Italy and China today at the end of Italian Foreign Trade Ministry undersecretary Baldassare Armato's visit to the country. The upshot of Armato's visit was a decision on the part of China to start drawing on the one billion dollar credit line Italy extended to the Bank of China in May 1979. The forty Italian businessmen who came here with the foreign trade official started signing preliminary contracts, or "letters of intent," with Chinese trade partners. Armato was received here yesterday by Deputy Premier Yao Yilin, with whom he explored the prospects of expanding trade and financial relations between Italy and China. [Text] [AU152045 Rome ANSA in English 1947 GMT 15 May 82]

CSO: 3120/63

FOREIGN INVESTMENTS CONTINUE TO RISE

Madrid ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA in Spanish 1 Apr 82 p 25

[Text] In 1981 net income from foreign investments grew by 55.6 percent in pesetas, and 20.9 percent in dollars. Portfolio investments have played a major role in this increase, having multiplied eight times in the past year.

During the last year, the flow of foreign capital to Spanish firms has improved notably with respect to the previous year, when stagnation, if not atrophe, was the rule in every type of foreign investment. The net balance of foreign investment yielded a positive 168.718 billion pesetas, a 55.6 percent jump over 1980. This result was brought about by the sharp drop in payments for liquidation of foreign investments, and above all, by the extraordinary performance of portfolio investments. Purchases by foreigners on the Spanish stock markets soared 102 percent, and that factor, along with the dramatic fall in payments for liquidations, yielded a net balance eight times higher than that of 1980.

Obviously, the depreciation of the peseta with respect to the dollar has strongly influenced these results, which could be misleading, depending on whether they are given in terms of dollars or pesetas. Thus, for example, while direct investments in Spanish companies grew by 13 percent in pesetas (100.22 billion pesetas in 1981, as opposed to 88.757 billion in 1980), the dollar figure was a negative 12.4 percent. As for real estate investments, both figures are on the positive side, the increase in pesetas being 33.7 percent and that of dollars being a mere 4.1 percent.

Gross investments under the category of "other forms of investment" yielded similar results: 46.968 billion pesetas, a 42 percent growth over the previous year's investments, while the dollar increase was only 8.6 percent. The winner of the "best performance by an investor" prize was the portfolio investments category, which grew by 161 percent in pesetas, 102 percent in dollars.

Lower Payments

Under the category of payments for the liquidation of foreign investments, there was an overall decline of 14.1 percent in pesetas, and nearly 34 percent in dollars. This phenomenon has been felt most strongly in the balance

of the Bank of Spain's cashbook. Within the category of "disinvestment," there was a noteworthy drop of 47 percent (measured in dollars) in direct investment, and a 30.6 percent decline in "other forms of investment." The latter, however, is very questionable because a fundamental element in it is the statistical code "advances on account of corporate shares," which is merely compensatory, and accounts for funds before the initiation of a foreign investment; it is annulled after the investment.

Foreign investment certainly experienced a remarkable growth in 1981, but it is not attributable to a better performance by the national economy in general, to higher productivity, or to lower inflation; rather, it is due to the peseta's parity with the dollar, the heavier flow of foreign investment into the Spanish stock markets, and the curbing of the disinvestment trend. Thus, there is no cause for celebration, although we should take note of the positive stimulation of the flow of foreign capital toward Spain after a year of lethargy in 1980.

Increase in Net Investments
(Balance of foreign investments in 1981, in millions of monetary units)

	1979		1980		1981	
	Pesetas	Dollars	Pesetas	Dollars	Pesetas	Dollars
Direct investment	54,384.5	812.6	66,398.3	922.2	84,676.2	917.2
Portfolio investment	6,655.3	98.2	1,225.5	14.2	10,610.7	114.5
Real estate investment	38,803.6	549.2	41,955.7	585.5	56,929.5	618.0
Other forms of investment	2,644.7	37.7	-1,150.3	-14.9	16,501.7	172.0
Total	100,488.1	1,497.7	108,429.2	1,506.9	168,718.1	1,821.6

Source: Cashbook, Bank of Spain

8926

CSO: 3110/121

RECENT AGREEMENTS WITH EC LISTED

Madrid ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA in Spanish 1 Apr 82 p 33

[Article by Ramon Rodriguez Lavin]

[Text] The first agreement at the negotiations in Brussels consists of a series of six of the 16 chapters that make up the overall negotiations. There has been no way to skirt the obstacle of patents, which have been excluded and will be included later in a chapter that will cover direct investments--essentially the sectors of transformation chemistry, electronics and data processing, in which Spain wants maximum protection--by the Ten in Spain.

The Spanish delegation, led by Minister of Foreign Affairs Jose Pedro Perez-Llorca, clearly expressed its satisfaction with the agreement negotiated on these six chapters: movement of capital, transportation, regional politics, the right to set up businesses and the freedom to provide services, the coordination of legislation, and economic and financial matters. The minister termed the session "fruitful, positive and satisfactory." It has enabled the delegations to reach "tangible and numerous agreements." After many contacts and preparatory meetings, the heart of the problems was discussed at the negotiating table. The meeting was a long one, for the first time. From the moment it joins the European Community, Spain will adhere to all of the Community's norms with regard to these areas of agreement, with the exception of the temporary derogations and the provisional measures that have been agreed upon.

Movement of Capital

A temporary derogation, lasting 3 years, has been agreed upon for the personal property sector; 5 years for the real property sector. For 5 years after Spain joins the Common Market, residents of Spain may not make any real property investments in the countries of the European Economic Community (EEC), with the exception of emigrants, within the framework of the free circulation of workers.

Transportation

From the first day of Spain's membership, the tachograph will be used for trucks engaged in national transport, and in the transport of dangerous

materials. In the national transport of goods by highway, a derogation of up to 4 years on the tonnage provision has been granted. For the national transport of passengers, for vehicles of more than nine passengers, the derogation lasts 3 years. The provision will be phased in gradually, according to the age of the vehicle.

Regional Politics

The EEC has agreed with the Spanish delegation to include a protocol, annexed to the membership treaty, that will set forth the criteria for regional community politics as a function of Spain's particular regional development. The EEC has agreed to adapt the mechanisms of the Regional Development Fund (FEDER) before Spain joins. In this way, Spanish regions and zones with development problems will not be less favored than other areas of the Common Market in the same situation.

Right to Establish Businesses, Freedom To Provide Services

The EEC has granted a temporary derogation of 7 years for Spain to apply the "economic needs" clause, which provides for controls on the development of foreign financial institutions in accordance with the national situation.

There will be a period of 7 years for Spanish legislation to adopt standards for the operation of banks. Afterwards, the banks of the member states of the EEC may freely install branches in Spain. Foreign banks may gradually increase the amount of financial resources they obtain outside the banking sector for the next 7 years, until a total of 100 percent is reached; at present, the maximum amount authorized in public is 40 percent. As for the number of agencies, it will remain the same for the first 4 years after Spain joins the EEC, and then will grow gradually for 3 years until it reaches eight.

Civil liability in automobile insurance must extend to all countries of the European Community; thus, the green card for visits abroad will no longer be valid.

Coordination of Legislation

A 3-year derogation has been agreed upon--this is the period provided for the restructuring of Spanish refineries--to diminish the lead content in super and extra gasoline and attain the level required by the EEC. No derogation will be allowed for regular gasoline.

Under this chapter, it has not been possible to avoid the obstacle of patents, and in order not to become bogged down in this quicksand, it has been decided to detach that particular issue. The Spanish delegation was asking for a transitional period of 9 years to conform to the conventions of Munich and Luxemburg which regulate the patent legislation of the EEC. There has been no agreement, however, and a committee of experts will continue to study the issue. The conflict has been particularly apparent in the pharmaceutical and fine chemicals sectors: adhering to these conventions

or agreeing to a short transitional period would jeopardize 115,000 jobs, and some 500 billion pesetas in current transactions.

Economic and Financial Matters

It was agreed to leave the discussion of the integration of the peseta into the European Unit of Account (ECU--which equals practically 100 pesetas) until after Spain becomes a member. An agreement has been reached on the degree of Spanish participation in the Community's mechanisms of credit and loans.

Objectives for June

Now that Spain has achieved the first goal it set with the Belgian delegation (which is the chair of the European Council for the first half of the year), and in view of the good results, other objectives have been established for the second quarter. At the next ministerial session, slated for 21 June in Luxemburg, an attempt will be made to finalize the negotiations on the following chapters: customs union, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), foreign relations, supervision, and Euratom. At the same time, the Spanish representatives have declared their intention to provide a boost for the agriculture and fishing chapters, trying to remove as many obstacles as possible in view of the difficulty of these issues.

8926

CSO: 3110/121

SHIPBUILDERS ADOPT PLAN TO INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY

Madrid YA in Spanish 13 Apr 82 p 32

[Article by Carmen Parra]

[Text] The workplace adjustment plan of the large shipbuilder sector, which is to be studied soon by representatives of management and labor, has been completed. This study is designed to develop the feasibility plan turned in by the division of naval construction of the National Institute of Industry (INI) to the follow-up committee, pursuant to the agreements reached on the revitalization and reconversion of the shipbuilding sector. The principal issues addressed are: production program, objectives and measurements of productivity, current and future payrolls by trade union, net surplus, reconversion plan for payrolls, current and future auxiliary industry, and the plan of action for each center, YA has learned. The adjustment plan for the workplaces of the Ria del Nervion area includes the assignment of a number of ships for Sestao and Olaveaga. The production of engines has been determined in the following manner: 150,000 BHP [British horsepower] to the engine factory at the Sestao center, and 70,000 BHP to the medium-speed and semi-fast engines at the Olaveaga center. As for the Asua work center, production is slated to reach 3,850 tons. Sestao has also been assigned 400,000 direct hours for ship repairs.

The study claims that the adjustment of the future market through the establishment of full competitiveness in the shipbuilding sector, entails a considerable effort to improve productivity. The following objectives were set forth: rationalization of the organization of work, reduction of the hours required per ton produced, elimination of dead time in productive processes, organization of the time periods required to execute the work, improved quality standards, better monitoring of progress on the job, reduction of costs in the procurement of materials, and economic and financial adjustments to meet the needs of the workplaces in this area.

The measures to be taken to achieve the objectives set forth are as follows: updating of work systems and methods to meet current and foreseeable needs, with an estimated investment of 5.3 billion pesetas in the Ria del Nervion area for the duration of the plan; strict control of production; the application of incentives by trades, by areas or individually; the monitoring of attendance to cut absenteeism; the creation of **uniformity**

among the trades; the conversion of **contract** personnel into **staff** personnel; and the adjustment of the development of the project and construction plans to a greater degree of product synthesis.

For the payroll reconversion plan, the following gross surpluses have been determined: in Sestao, 915 people; in Olaveaga, 626; and in Asua, 120. The respective cuts are 545, 558 and 47. The additions are 200, 67 and 0; the surpluses, 570, 135 and 73. The personnel reconversions will total 248 at Sestao. Net surpluses are 322, 135 and 73.

Labor Peace Necessary

In the adjustment plan for the shipyard at Puerto Real (Cadiz), conventional annual production is summed up in the following vessels: two 76,000-TPM Obos, two 60,000-TPM [expansion unknown, perhaps tons per month] Bulkcarriers, a 21,000-TPM Ro-Ro, and a 161,000-TPM Bulkcarrier. This program calls for the employment of 4,620,000 man-hours for the productivity objective that has been set.

The Puerto Real shipyard, to meet the plan's basic objective of attaining an equilibrium in 1984, will have to achieve a productivity of 33 direct hours/TRBC. This means an increase in productivity of about 21 percent over the 1982 goal, nearly 40 direct hours/TRBC.

In terms of labor relations, labor peace must be attained and, in turn, a rapid and effective means must be found to resolve conflicts, making full use of all channels of communication and participation, and ensuring a firm commitment by management and the shop committee to join efforts in order to attain the objectives set forth.

Repairs in Cadiz

The plan for the Cadiz shipyard for 1984 is as follows: the shipyard will be devoted exclusively to the repair of ships, including conventional and major repairs, as well as conversions and occasionally the construction of floating devices; all mechanized work from the two shipyards in the bay will be concentrated in the Cadiz shipyard, and the cabinet-making shop will be segregated and supplied by an external auxiliary industry.

In order to update existing facilities, an investment of 1.05 billion pesetas will be needed between 1982 and 1984. One of labor's fundamental conditions is a guarantee of absolute job security, and of the overtime hours that are necessary and that are usual in competitive firms. Another goal is maximum **uniformity** among the trades.

The principal activity at the Seville yard will focus on new ship construction, with complementary lines being the marketing under MacGregor license of hatchway covers and equipment for access to the cargo, and the repair of ships. The current production level of new construction is six ships per year, with an investment of between 2.3 million and 2.4 million direct hours.

To meet these objectives, the hours per year in 1982 will have to be 1,800; 1,860 in 1983 and 1984. Absenteeism was supposed to be 11 percent last

year, and 10.5 percent in 1982, 1983 and 1984. The figures for **strikes** are 1, 2.5, and 1.5 percent, respectively. The figure for technical shutdowns, 1 percent; for transfers to **contract** personnel, 3.5, 2, and 3 percent. Thus, net hours in 1982 will total 1,579; in 1983, 1,562; and in 1984, 1,562.

Diesel Engine for Manises

At the Manises (Valencia) shipyard, a little over a year ago a plan was devised for the manufacture of a diesel engine **in an assembly plant**. This is the result of an analysis of the costs of elements manufactured in this center which could be made abroad with similar quality and at a more economical price, leaving these shops free to devote themselves exclusively to the production of those elements whose dimensions, quality, importance or cost preclude their manufacture abroad.

Based on these premises, the following annual program has been drawn up: four 5-7 cylinder engines, type K/L90; two type K/L80 engines, and six type K/L67 engines.

Minicomputers to Control Absenteeism

The study states that the shop committee and the personnel should be made aware of how important it is for them to cooperate enthusiastically and decisively for the smooth progress of production and the economic results of the shipyard. As for external absenteeism, the shipyard is going to modernize its system for monitoring attendance and punctuality by installing minicomputers, which will provide information in realistic terms, so that action can be taken where appropriate.

According to the general feasibility plan for the large shipyards, at present there is a surplus of some 20 people, approximately, on the payroll; the number of people required to carry out this plan is 1,168. Once the early retirements predicted for the 1982-84 period have taken place, a total deficit of 60 people is foreseen. These vacancies will have to be covered continually in order to maintain the figure of 1,168 people.

According to the feasibility plans, the central offices of AESA in Madrid are to make a readjustment in order to modify their structure and dimensions according to the new characteristics of the corporation, which has been reorganized in accordance with the established production and profitability objectives. In this regard, these offices are supposed to be reduced to management and marketing activities. By the end of 1984, the payroll of these offices should consist of 90 people, so given its present number of 274, the gross excess is 184. These surplus employees can be absorbed by the formation of Satena as a technology firm which will be in charge of directing and promoting that activity in the firms of that division of the National Institute of Industry (INI). The implementation of the adjustment plan for the Astano-Ferrol shipyard is based on the current portfolio combined with a hypothetical one, considering present market trends and the assumption that the current labor union structure will stabilize as much as possible.

Given the inclination of the national and international markets, and considering the prototypes of ships that are required, this shipyard has selected those ships which, within the TRB limit per ship that it has established, best fulfill the requirements in terms of the capacity of their facilities as well as the stability of the payroll.

Consequently, the production program consists of a real portfolio of contracted ships and a hypothetical portfolio based on the following vessels:

150,000-TPM Bulkcarriers for foreign shipbuilders (the BK-1, BK-2 and BK-3), BK-4 and BK-5 for national shipbuilders, which represent the current trends on the market for possible contracts; and OBO-1 and OBO-2, considered to be for foreign shipbuilders, and which will in some way stabilize the payrolls of the shipping sectors.

8926

CSO: 3110/121

OZAL DISCUSSES ISLAMIC COOPERATION, ECONOMY

TA221558 Ankara ANATOLIA in English 1540 GMT 22 May 82

[Text] Istanbul, 22 May (AA)--Turkish Deputy Premier Turgut Ozal said his government believes closer cooperation among Islamic states would contribute to a higher standard of living domestically as well as to positive developments in the world economy. He made the statement at a session with foreign and Turkish journalists in Istanbul for the conference of Central Bank governors from Islamic states Friday, to be followed by the board of governors meeting of the Islamic Development Bank Monday.

Ozal had told the Central Bank governors earlier the world had become a world of trade and economic relations, to which Islamic states should attach primary importance.

He believed the conferences being held in Istanbul would further joint projects and cooperation among Islamic states.

Turkish Economy

Answering questions about the Turkish economy and its external relations, Ozal noted Turkey's balance of payments had improved considerably since 1979, with exports rising from 2 billion dollars to 4.7 billion dollars in 1981 and an estimated 6 billion dollars in 1982. Inflation, meanwhile had dropped from 100 percent to less than 40 percent, while GNP grew by 4.4 percent net in 1981.

Europe and Israel

Ozal was critical of EEC member countries, who imposed restrictions on Turkish cotton textile exports in violation of existing association agreements while IMF and the World Bank advocated freedom of trade.

He said Turkey had no economic relations with Israel, while diplomatic contact had been reduced to the minimum level of third secretary.

Turkey had been cultivating a program of exports oriented to the Middle East and Arab states over the past 2 years, but found the current highway and communications connections inadequate.

CSO: 4600/464

RESULTS OF ISLAMIC CENTRAL BANK GOVERNORS MEETING NOTED

TA231830 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 1600 GMT 23 May 82

[Text] The fifth Islamic conference Central Bank directors meeting has ended in Istanbul. In a statement at the close of the meeting, Central Bank director Osman Siklar expressed the belief that the meeting played a very important role in enhancing solidarity among Islamic countries and that it created a sense of economic unity. However, Siklar pointed out that conferences and decisions alone are not sufficient. He said: The important thing is to implement these decisions in our countries without fail. In addition, we must hold frequent bilateral contacts and allow our knowledge, experience and resources to mutually benefit our countries. Thus we can aim to be included among developed countries rather than developing countries.

The Turkish Central Bank issues a statement in connection with the meeting. According to the statement, the urgent need of some members of the conference for financial resources was discussed during the meetings. It was requested that all the necessary procedures be undertaken to insure the speedy implementation of an agreement encouraging and guaranteeing investments among member countries. The meeting also stressed the need to increase agricultural loans to allow the Islamic countries to become self-sufficient in foods. Technical working groups were also established during the meeting to develop capital markets in member countries and to study the various aspects of export financing.

An Islamic history, art and culture research center was also opened in Istanbul. Speaking at the inauguration of the center, state and deputy Prime Minister Turgut Ozal said that the Islamic conference organization constitutes the most profound example of unity and solidarity. Noting that culture is more important than technology and economics for a happy world, Ozal said that a beneficial cooperation in technical and economic fields can only be realized within an atmosphere of cultural solidarity.

In his statement, Islamic conference secretary general Habib Chatti noted that the Islamic history, art and culture research center will constitute a cornerstone in securing the cultural solidarity of the Islamic world.

He said the work of the center is very important in introducing the Islamic cultural heritage. Chatti continued: It is a fact that the establishment of mutual understanding is necessary to achieve a healthy dialogue between the Islamic and Western civilizations. The rights usurped from the Muslims and the sacred values that have been trampled upon must be returned for the creation of such an understanding within the Islamic world.

The establishment of the center in Istanbul was decided on during the Islamic countries' foreign ministers' meeting in Istanbul in 1976 upon the proposal of the Turkish delegate.

CSO: 4654/323

BRIEFS

IDB AGREEMENTS--An agreement has been signed in Istanbul enabling Turkish private citizens to invest in the Islamic Investment Bank. The \$11 million agreement was signed by the bank chairman, (Ahmad Mohammad Ali), and by the director general of the Turkish Industrial Development Bank, Oztan Eroguz. In another agreement signed in Istanbul, the Islamic Development Bank extended a \$10-million loan to the Kutaha magnesium industrial plant owned by Etibank. The agreement was signed by Tunc Bilget, the Finance Ministry international economic cooperation organization director general, and by the Islamic Bank chairman. The directors of the central banks of Islamic conference countries are meeting in Istanbul. [Excerpt] [TA221039 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 1000 GMT 22 May 82]

CSO: 4654/323

DISCUSSION ON ULUSU VISIT TO NORTHERN CYPRUS

NC210956 Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 18 May 82 p 3

["Cyprus Letter" column by Resat Akar: "The Prime Minister's Visit"]

[Text] For the first time in history, a Turkish prime minister will visit the island of Cyprus. Prime Minister Bulent Ulusu's visit to northern Cyprus, which is under the protection of Turkish soldiers, is an important event that will be written in history in golden letters.

The Turkish Cypriot community, which has been waging a struggle for freedom and which has lived in fear of its life, property and honor for years, but which has never abandoned the shadow of the Turkish flag and which has never swerved from Ataturk's path, is impatiently waiting to hold Ulusu to its bosom.

The Turkish Cypriots fully realize the truthfulness of the adage "only a mother's tears are true." Only our fatherland, Turkey, wept for us during the years 1963-1974 when Makarios shed our blood. Only Turkey tried to heal our economic wounds after 1974. The Turkish Cypriots, who will never deny this truth, will certainly try their best to accord the most appropriate welcome to the prime minister of their fatherland.

During this visit, many individuals and organizations would like to discuss their problems with the honorable Ulusu, because the political order, which has failed to protect economic wealth and which looks upon democracy only from the individual and party interests points of view, has recently assumed more perilous dimensions. Networks of thieves placed in the most critical positions in the state and leading militant acts of smuggling which are capable of threatening both Turkey and Cyprus.

No one seems to pay any attention to the wailings of our fellow countrymen desperately struggling under these conditions. The representatives of our fatherland in the TESC, bewitched by the bandits surrounding them, have also failed to see or hear anything. As if everything is in ship-shape order and as if our fellow countrymen are living in peace and comfort, they send luxurious reports to the fatherland, keeping it in the dark about developments in Cyprus.

The program prepared for Prime Minister Ulu's visit is interesting. The program says that industrial installations, martyrs' cemeteries and many other places will be visited, but there is no mention in the program prepared by the Turkish Embassy of any vital issues such as the refugees, smuggling, propaganda activities and the problems of the workers and government employees.

After seeing this program, we cannot help congratulating the Greek Embassy for making it possible for the representatives of the refugees and the syndicates as well as for the mayors to have had talks with Prime Minister Papandreou, who visited the Greek Cypriot sector only 3 months ago.

CSO: 4654/321

PAPER SEES SOVIET DESIGNS BEHIND MINIMUM PROGRAM

NC160802 Nicosia O AGON in Greek 16 May 82 pp 1, 12

[Dispatch by O AGON's Athens correspondent]

[Text] Athens, 16 May--The Greek Government will soon put President Spyros Kyprianou in a terrible dilemma and will call on him to choose between the nation and the course that has been jointly charted on the Cyprus problem and his embrace with AKEL and the minimum program of the two cooperating parties, which runs contrary to the joint line and creates insurmountable problems for Greece's foreign policy.

I am in a position to know that the silence which the Greek Government has been observing will not last long. The Greek Government will soon use harsh language and indisputable arguments, because it believes--it has numerous evidence to this effect--that there are deeper reasons behind the AKEL-Democratic Party [DIKO] cooperation that aim at creating problems for the Papandreou Government.

The Soviet Union is behind the cooperation of the two parties. As a result of the AKEL-DIKO minimum program and its great influence on AKEL, the Soviet Union will actually control developments in the Cyprus problem at a time of great tension in the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and the West in general.

I am also in a position to report that since the announcement of the minimum program, the Greek Government has ceased to brief the Cyprus Government on questions of a "confidential nature," because it fears that they may be leaked to AKEL and through AKEL to Moscow.

An indication of the Greek Government's bitterness and indignation over the attitude of President Kyprianou and his government, who have been condoning for 2 whole weeks AKEL's insults and abuses of Prime Minister Papandreou, is a recent, strongly worded article carried in EXORMISIS--Pasok's official paper--which calls on President Kyprianou to "openly and boldly" condemn the insults.

The EXORMISIS article says:

"One more week has passed and we have neither seen nor heard a word of condemnation or denunciation from President Kyprianou of the insults and the mudslinging by his partisan partners against the popularly elected leader and stout defender of Cyprus' cause, Greece's Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou.

"Does Mr Kyprianou think that he is covered by the alibi 'it is they who are saying all this not me'?

"But those who are saying all this are going to co-govern the Republic of Cyprus--if the joint plans are firm--and the pertinent contracts have been signed to this effect. Therefore, Mr Kyprianou cannot be relieved of the responsibility of being an accomplice.

"Thus, we hope that he may have forgotten this and for this reason we will wait, hoping that the Cypriot leader will openly and boldly do so. The opposite would not be for the benefit of the common cause of the Greek people, who are not to be blamed for this wretchedness and who--despite all this--are resolved to continue the struggle on its correct foundations."

CSO: 4621/338

BAHRO WANTS DKP OUT OF PEACE MOVEMENT

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 12 Apr 82 p 30

[Article entitled: "The DKP Is A Foreign Body." Rudolf Bahro On the Dissension In the Peace Movement]

[Text] Large groups in the peace movement have dissociated themselves from the DKP. At a conference of over 800 delegates from 350 organizations the Greens in Bad Godesberg on the Sunday before last refused to sign an appeal for a demonstration on the occasion of the Bonn NATO conference on 10 June. Their objection: the paper had the stamp of the DKP. Former SED functionary Rudolf Bahro, expatriate of the GDR, established why the DKP is not fit to be an alliance partner in the peace movement. Excerpt from the manuscript of Bahro's speech.

The draft is the typical product of those kinds of conniving in which the field of the DKP, which is organizationally constantly overrepresented, always exacts the beloved consensus on the lukewarm smallest common denominator. The fact that Afghanistan and Poland are mentioned in it is deceptive. If need be, these people are ready to swallow many a toad if in so doing the upshot of it is only that Brezhnev in the end is not short one missile in order "to guarantee peace."

This means that nuclear death threatens us all. This is correct. It threatens Herbert Mies, and it threatens Franz Josef Strauss. He also does not want bombs to fall on Bavaria. But he has not yet counted himself as a part of the peace movement. By what right do those people count themselves as part of the peace movement who feel themselves linked with the Eastern bloc and justify and gloss over in their press here every crime that is committed out of Moscow?

Where is the difference between the death squads in El Salvador and the armored helicopters in Afghanistan? The Soviets, with their own hands, are cutting down the resistance there. Millions of people, perhaps a fifth of the population, have fled the country. And hasn't Moscow thus with this intervention furthered the psychological conditions for the appearance of Reagan?

What kind of double standard is that which in the draft protests, rightfully protests, the "misanthropic intervention policy of the U.S. government in Central America" and then prattles on about the "political solution" for Afghanistan? Likewise in the case of Poland. What kind of peace is that which is meant by

those people among us for whom General Jaruzelski is the dear comrade. As everyone knows, they say that Jaruzelski saved world peace. In case that is true, then it means that the Soviet Union would risk nuclear war in order to possess Poland.

They are clinging here to pacifism, but their political homeland is there, where the decisions are made to remove stickers on the autobahns to Berlin which say: "Create Peace Without Weapons" and to persecute young people in the GDR who wear emblems which say: "Swords into Plow Shares." Their peace must be armed. The weapons must only be in the hands of those found to be the right ones. We advocate here unilateral disarmament, side by side with people who have never corrected their point of view: "The stronger the Soviet Union, the more secure the peace."

How long do we still want to imagine that we could pull together with these hypocrites? Haig is by no means the only one for whom there are more important things than peace. The advocates of the Eastern variant of deterrence think and practice the same thing. The Soviet Union in the 1970's also actively turned the armament screw.

The DKP is the agency of the other bloc in our movement, a foreign body, a fossil from the time of the Cold War. With its overall policy it is one of the little wheels in the mechanism of bloc confrontation which produces war. There is one dragon with two heads and one of these heads is rising up in our midst.

We need total organizational separation, everywhere. Easter marches cannot be negotiated with them. An end to these abnormal "alliances" on all levels! One by one we must discuss their ideological positions right out of the peace movement. Surely we cannot and do not want to exclude anyone from participation. At issue is the fact that these forces can no longer force their conditions upon us. The myth of the unity of the peace movement, the insistence on the minimum consensus is nothing other than a well thought out deception for us, with which they exploit the need of the movement for harmony.

Thus, for June 10th there can be no common appeal with them, even with the risk that fewer people will come then. We must not sacrifice the long-term future to a Pyrrhic victory. The time up to June 10th is sufficient in order to make clear to all interested people what is at stake. The polarization against the DKP policy in the peace movement, against the entire spectrum which makes the preliminary work for them, is the prerequisite for every greater bit of forward movement into the majority of the people.

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CSO: 3103/413

CDU'S GEISSLER ON PEACE, SECURITY POLICY

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 16 Apr 82 p 14

[Article by Heiner Geissler, secretary general of the CDU, reprinted from the CDU-linked critical quarterly SONDE in German No 1, 1982, originally titled "Den Frieden gewinnen!" (To Win the Peace!)]

[Text] There are few issues more hotly debated among ourselves than the question of how we can most effectively assure peace in a nuclear age. This is understandable since peace is threatened and the loss of peace threatens the very existence of mankind.

This is why I see in the recently renewed discussions of peace the opportunity to explore the intellectual foundations and the political goals of our national security and foreign policies. The positive challenge of the peace movement consists in its forcing us to a radical rethinking of the ethical roots of our policies. The comparison of each side's armaments is necessary but it is not in itself sufficient. "I'm a human being and not a mathematician," one young person said to me recently in a discussion. This thesis may sound bewildering but does it not also betray a justified concern or even a humane commitment? What seems to me to be certain is that there are many critical and reflective people whom we have not reached because our answers are still too superficial.

If we try to give some kind of structure to the complex discussion of peace, then four questions emerge, to which we must respond if we are to translate the challenge posed by the peace movement into a chance for peace and freedom. They are elementary questions of politics:

1. Is our political order worth defending?
2. Is it the function of the state to defend its people against a threat from abroad?
3. Does such a threat exist now or in the foreseeable future?
4. If the first three questions are affirmed, by what means is our defense to be effected?

It is evident that each question can only be affirmed if the preceding one has been clarified and affirmed. The political and, especially, the national security debate has concentrated primarily on the fourth question of strategic

doctrine, while the doubts of many persons as well as the sound reasons for a policy of defense through deterrence are to be found at another level altogether, to which I have alluded with the first questions--questions which are hotly debated today--and sometimes answered in the negative. This circumstance is frequently overlooked and this is the reason why we frequently and at great length talk past each others ears.

The Ethics of Democracy

The institutions of our state are only worth defending in the event that, and only as long as, they serve the individual person: "The dignity of the individual is inviolable. To respect it and to protect it is the obligation of all state power." Thus reads the first article of our constitution. Conversely it also holds that individuals require the institutions of the state for the protection of their rights, their freedoms and their dignity. The ethics of democracy are based upon the dignity of the individual and unique person. For the sake of the consequences for mankind the democratic constitutional state deserves priority over other conceivable alternatives.

It is true: even a good form of the state cannot assure man's happiness. Yet a bad form of the state can thrust humans deep into unhappiness. Politics and its institutions intrude themselves deeply into the everyday lives of people. Older people among us have had to feel this keenly: in the Third Reich; many people are experiencing and suffering it even today: in Poland, for example. Younger people in the Federal Republic only see or hear of such on the television.

There does exist a small minority which rejects a free democracy and the values of Western civilization upon which it is based. They pose no danger to democracy and I will not concern myself with them here further.

Yet there are two other developments which are cause for concern: liberal democracy stands in sharp contrast to totalitarian dictatorship of the Right or the Left. The second German democracy found its definition in this twofold delimitation: as a liberal and thereby as an anti-totalitarian political order. This definition has changed in broad spheres of scholarly and public discussion. In place of the conceptual polarity of democracy--totalitarianism, there came forward the polarity, fascism--socialism, whereby "socialism" for many, despite all negative experience in the past and in the present, still represents a hope that oftentimes overlooks the totalitarian core of Societ "socialism." This development was "a political phenomenon of the greatest psychological significance" (K.D. Bracher), because it indicated a shifting of political standards and values. We can see the consequences today in the discussion of domestic and foreign issues, not least in the case of the fundamental questions of security policy. The younger generation--as a result of its historical experience--lacks in large part the awareness that freedom and democracy are not to be taken for granted but are instead linked to very fragile assumptions. Many young people regard democracy and the constitutional state; welfare and social security as "normal" and not requiring any special efforts or defense on their behalf; the experiences of one generation are not easily transmitted to the next. Stated as a paradox: the more successful a society, the longer a period of peace, the more difficult it is and the more effort required to preserve the conditions of this success.

The Function of the State

If our political order is worth defending for the sake of mankind and its dignity, then it follows that it is the function of the state to preserve this order against threats from within and without--unless one could assume not only that all men were of good will, but that they would also act accordingly.

This irenic, peacekeeping function of the state is undisputed domestically. The modern state has eliminated jungle law, civil and religious warfare. The democratic constitutional state is the successful attempt to guarantee the common freedom and security of all; more precisely: to protect the life, the liberty and the basic rights of all men, which it cannot do without the resources of power. Whoever would prevent the stronger from asserting his will over the weaker must grant to the state a monopoly on the use of force. The socially equitable state assumes a functioning constitutional state. Otherwise, domestic peace cannot be permanently preserved.

This function of the state cannot be individualized. Not only is the individual too weak for such a role, but even the attempt to do so would lead to jungle law and to civil war--and thereby destroy the very thing that the individual would want to protect for himself: his rights and his security.

The question remains whether this holds true only for internal or also--by analogy--for international relationships. In principle, i.e. seen from the point of view of the individual, I can see no difference: it is immaterial by whom his peace is threatened and his dignity violated. Whoever would grant the same rights to all, based upon the human dignity of each; whoever recognizes no moral principle at work in the right of the stronger over the weaker inhering in the law of the jungle, according to which the collective life of individuals and people could be ordered--cannot make distinctions in the one case, domestically, and in the other case--in international terms--accept surrender and demonstrative willingness of the state to weakness. Granted that the means employed are different, in the one case those of the constitutional state, in the other those of deterrence.

It is evident: what we are talking about here with these two questions are classical questions of politics and political philosophy. Aristotle formulated them first and answered them in classically liberal fashion: the state should not simply assure the life of its people, it should also make possible their "good life."

The CDU's Hamburg resolution of 1981 read as follows: The Christian commandment that we should love our neighbor demands of us that we respect, protect and defend human rights and human dignity. It does not demand of us that we passively tolerate their violation. Individuals may personally choose to reject the use of force; but the community within the state has as its function in every case to protect the citizen from the use of force. Even in our own time it is not morally permissible to expose one's own people to dictatorship and the loss of freedom."

The Threat to Peace and Freedom

I do not wish to deny the Soviet's will to peace. More precisely: in my opinion, they do want to achieve their political goals, which do not coincide with our political ideals, without war and they have also done this wherever possible; passive resistance, demonstrative willingness for weakness has nowhere hindered them; to look upon these means as alternatives to our security police seems to me almost cynical in the light of the sufferings of the people of Afghanistan or Poland.

In the end it is not weapons as such that threaten peace, but the political will which lies behind them. This will become clear from another piece of evidence: never has a country compelled its economy and its citizens to the service of armaments to the degree that the Soviet Union has done for years, even decades.

But for large sections of the peace movement the Soviet Union simply does not exist--not the SS-20's that they have been deploying week after week, nor their manifestly expansive policy in Africa and Asia, nor their aggressive understanding of "peaceful coexistence," nor their totalitarian apparatus for rule that is immune to all criticism, including, of course, that of the peace movement.

Many people simply close their eyes to this reality because one can live so much more calmly that way.

The Nuclear Threshold Situation

If our political order is worth being defended and if it is threatened, then the question remains how it should be defended. But here too I can only pose a few basic questions. The peace movement has concentrated upon what many people in recent times have described as the "nuclear threshold situation." Many have demanded, among other things, a rejection of the nuclear components of deterrence. Is this position intellectually and morally honest if we do not also take into account whether wars are more or less likely through such a step?

My question is: does not this fixation upon nuclear weapons systems, unintentionally through implicitly--suggest taking conventional wars less seriously? Would such a war as World War II be a possible, even an acceptable alternative? Can one, even under moral criteria, so uncritically ignore the fact that behind the umbrella of nuclear deterrence there have been no wars in Europe for almost 40 years, while in other regions of the world there have been more than 100?

Horizons of a Peaceful World

The strategy of flexible deterrence has to date prevented the outbreak of a war. Has it by the same token assured peace?

What is peace?

Peace is more than simply the absence of war. Peace is not necessarily present when the weapons are silent. A permanent peace requires more than this.

--A peaceful world requires education for peace. The individual must learn to develop his potential freely but he must also learn not only to respect the freedoms of others, but also to work actively to make them possible. Peace sustains itself from tolerance and respect for others. For this reason it is not theories of conflict that should be incorporated into the curricular guidelines of our schools but education for peace and for tolerance.

--Peace is only possible when human rights and the right to liberty are respected. Peace without freedom is a pseudo-peace. The commitment to human rights or the commitment to people whose rights are being suppressed is a policy for peace. This must hold true not only for South Africa and Chile, but also for the peoples of the GDR, Poland and Afghanistan. Human rights apply universally. We cannot be silent in the face of injustice in the interests of peace; our commitment to fight injustice must be determined by the gravity of the injustice and not by the country in which it takes place.

--Anyone seeking to assure international peace permanently must also deal with the international social question, if for no other reason than that poverty, hunger and deprivation have been the cause of more deaths than all wars put together. Peace policy is therefore also social policy. We have no exclusive lease on the basic values and norms that we claim for ourselves and our society. We are part of a world whose people are becoming increasingly interdependent upon one another. Inhuman living conditions, social deprivation, the lack of liberty and the denial of human rights are the sources of conflict that make themselves felt throughout the world and we cannot remain immune to them. It would be naive to believe that Germany and Europe could remain permanent islands of peace, prosperity and liberty in a conflict-laden world. A fair balance of interests between the rich and the poor peoples of the world, a just organization of the world's economy; developmental assistance, both relief and assistance toward self-help--all of these are prerequisites to a policy that would prevent conflicts and assure peace.

It will be no small thing if we succeed in protecting the world from a new war. But we should not forget that our task only really begins with that. We expect a great deal from young people if we look to convince them of the paradoxes of our military-strategic thinking. This may be necessary because today there is no alternative. But this cannot be our last word on foreign and security policy. The perspectives must be broadened in terms of time, such that they are not accommodated to a heavily armed world, and in terms of space, in the sense that they must encompass those millions of people who are starving, suffering and dying in the shadow of our prosperity. The status quo is only defensible to the degree that we make every possible effort to overcome it. A policy which at one and the same time expends less money for development assistance and more for armaments would be gambling away its moral credit.

In concrete terms this means: greater efforts for development assistance policy and for disarmament. The 30th national party congress of the CDU emphasized this point in its Hamburg resolution of November 1981: "The most important foreign policy goal today is universal limitation and reduction of armaments and their balance at the lowest possible level consistent with undiminished security."

This is the way that the NATO double decision must be understood: as a timetable, as a strategy for disarmament. For the first time a new weapons system, already in the hands of our adversaries, has not been introduced simply as a matter of course, but its deployment--to be phased out under specified conditions--is linked to the outcome of negotiations.

Elsewhere in the Hamburg resolution it states: "Peace in the long run will be unattainable in the presence of extreme differences in the living conditions of individuals and peoples. Development assistance is therefore a decisive contribution to peace and as such must be given greater attention. The Christian commandment to love one's neighbor demands from us material and spiritual sacrifice to help assure the survival of millions of people. The effort to mandate the basic right to life throughout the world must become a moral imperative of Germany policy. We must live our own lives differently, so that others can survive."

An ethical basis for our foreign policy will only be possible if we understand defense through military deterrence as a necessary, though not of itself sufficient, component of our foreign and security policies. The road to a more equitable and peaceful world is long and difficult and the temptation to stray from it is great, whether for pacifism or armaments. These are not alternative paths, these are retreats.

The balance of military forces does not prevent the outbreak of a war, though it does make possible a kind of "negative peace." Thus it gains us time to work for the creation of a better world. We will one day be judged by the devotion with which we sought this--and by our success in having achieved it.

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SPD CONGRESS OUTCOME, VARYING FDP REACTIONS

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 26 Apr 82 pp 17-21

[Article: "Genscher: 'It Will Not End Well'"]

[Text] During the Munich party congress, SPD leaders succeeded in uniting the Social Democrats behind their chancellor. Whether the peace in Munich will give a new impetus to the party and the coalition will depend, above all, on Helmut Schmidt--and the FDP, which is resisting proposed tax increases.

During the Munich SPD congress, Klaus Boelling described to his political comrades the mood in which he returned from his post as permanent representative in East Berlin to his former position as government spokesman in Bonn. A friend had given him the following advice: "Stay where you are. The only thing you can do in Bonn is to embellish the funeral."

Boelling had no choice; the Schmidt supporter had to follow the chancellor's call. And as things go: "When looking into death valley," way below in that valley of death he sees "a ray of hope."

Since the party congress in the Olympic Stadium, the Social Democrats have gained new confidence that Boelling's vision is not only the result of dutiful and optimistic propaganda. In spite of all the dissatisfaction with the policy of the Bonn government, in spite of the dwindling affection for their own chancellor, in spite of anger about the Free Democratic coalition partner, the Social Democrats refrained from putting on good-bye scenes in Munich to indicate the loss of power.

There was no longing to become the opposition. It has become more difficult for FDP chief Hans Dietrich Genscher to base a separation from the partner on general confusion.

He still is not able to forgive one escapade: In their economic policy, the comrades offered to their partners all kinds of things, higher taxes for high-income people, a labor-market levy, state investment planning.

Nevertheless, there is harmony in security and energy policies: The comrades confirmed the government course even more unequivocally than Schmidt had hoped

to the very end. The times are over, when the vice chancellor could point to the chancellor. Whenever Schmidt had asked the FDP leader about the future of the alliance, Genscher became evasive: Before any further plans could be made, Schmidt would first have to unite the party behind himself.

There it is, and consequently the Free Democrats cannot really display indignation convincingly. Friday last week, Schmidt sent Hans-Huergen Wischemewski as a special envoy to the Foreign Office to inform his partner that the resolutions by his comrades concerning employment policies were merely intended to establish the Social Democratic position and that the chancellor had no illusions about how much of it could be realized with the FDP.

Genscher, however, was not satisfied with such allaying statements. At any rate, after the conflicts surrounding counterarming and nuclear energy had been contained, the liberal wanted to keep alive the disagreement on economic policies. At least in this area Genscher would like to reserve some arguments to be able to blame the Social Democrats if there should be a change in the coalition.

Consequently the FDP chairman had prepared a comprehensive list of complaints: The Munich SPD resolutions did not serve the purpose of fighting unemployment. Everything that had already been resolved by the government was being torn down and labeled inadequate. Only recently Schmidt had taken the cabinet's employment program and forced it through with the help of the question of confidence. Now he is among those who are calling for more state expenditures and tax increases. Genscher: "It will not end well."

The liberals are especially disturbed by the fact that the SPD Bundestag parliamentary group had been asked at the party congress to examine whether the reduction in wage and income taxes--promised by the government for 1984--could be implemented at all.

The FDP, on the other hand, would have preferred to put in writing the percentages of the tax reductions. In return, the Union would no longer block in the Bundesrat increases in the value-added tax, necessary to finance the employment program.

Genscher: After all the back and forth, the people out there do not know any longer what will happen." It is hurting the economy. And it cannot be of any benefit to the coalition if the FDP is portrayed by the partner and SPD leaders as a force that is responsible for the failure of an effective policy against unemployment.

The FDP chairman: "Just consider the consequences for the attitudes in the coalition, among SPD members and in labor unions. It takes hold and makes all dealings more difficult."

The voters would be confused if the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats were to say different things during the upcoming election campaigns in Hamburg, Hesse and Bavaria. The FDP chairman wants to make his future coalition strategy dependent on the outcome of Hamburg's municipal election on 6 June:

"Hamburg will be the fateful election." It is Helmut Schmidts' city; the chancellor said himself that he is involved.

In Willy Brandt's Munich plan, however, consideration for the election tactics and ideas of the liberals, for Genscher's ideological sentiments was not a matter of first priority. Brandt was concerned about the unity of his party. In his opening speech he demanded that "Social Democratic renewal" should be the most important task. This speech, Minister of Transportation Volker Hauff said enthusiastically, "can still be read even after the government has ceased to exist."

On Friday the chairman drew the balance with satisfaction and simultaneously he guarded against future accusations: "The party is more united and active. Now others will have to do their work. The difficulties of the government are not based on the idea that it lacks the support of the party--that is the result of Munich."

When the party adopted resolutions supporting counterarming and nuclear energy, the party also accepted the fact that it would gain hardly any voters from the ecology scene or the peace movement.

Only with respect to the employment policy, the fight among the delegates was rough before they decided on the Social Democratic course. "The chancellor himself even contributed to the resolutions," Minister for Economic Cooperation Rainer Offergeld commented, "the comrades felt a need to be able to demonstrate again what they wanted."

Everybody realized, however: The program to fight unemployment--which was supported by everybody from Right to Left--stands no chance of becoming government policy. Bremen's mayor Hans Koschnik said: The delegates as well as the labor unions know that a part of these resolutions cannot be realized.

Whatever may be good food for frustrated Social Democrats, cannot be very tasty for the rising bourgeoisie. Tax increases have never been very popular. A seasoned comrade like Bundestag Vice President Georg Leber is not impressed by the result of the Munich show: "The country's mood cannot be charged with a party congress--and it is against us."

In Brandt's opinion it can only be changed if in the future the coalition partners delineate their own contours more clearly--independently from the results that are later negotiated by the government.

Brandt is opposed to Genscher's view, according to which this strategy would endanger the coalition's ability to reach compromises. Rather, he is convinced: "To make the compromises easier to understand, one must say what one wants." And: "Since when have tax laws been made during SPD congresses?"

There are other Social Democrats who are glad that at least in this area the search for a profile was successful. Offergeld said: "During the last few months Genscher really put the screws to us. It would really be the last straw if the FDP were to prevent us from showing our profile."

Hugo Brandt, Rhineland-Palatinate's Land chairman, stated: "The FDP cannot do two things at the same time: On one hand, complain about the condition of the SPD and, on the other hand--when the SPD appears united--say: We do not like it."

The fact that it is difficult for the FDP leadership to accept the Munich resolutions, is apparent from the dissonant notes within its own ranks. A few people, like Genscher, are getting very excited; others are asking themselves, what has happened that is so bad.

General Secretary Guenter Verheugen agreed with the party chairman, saying that Munich brought about a crisis: From now on cooperation will be difficult the credibility of the coalition is at stake because "the basic positions are enormously far apart."

Even the minister of economics did not let the favorable opportunity slip by without stirring up conflicts. Graff Lambsdorff criticized exactly the unity of the Social Democrats which he had earlier missed so often: "I did not expect that the members of the government would remain silent."

Lambsdorff painted the "danger" on the wall--as always when it is intended against the socialists and the coalition, on Genscher's course--"that the SPD parliamentary group and cabinet members will now attempt to put through one or the other matter." In short: He threatened once again with the end of the coalition, if surcharges or labor market levies were demanded or even the tax reduction plans for 1984 were called in question.

Those liberals who did not want to create any new problems for the coalition by getting excited, acted quite differently. Wolfgang Mischnick, leader of the parliamentary group, mentioned that he "completely understood" that the Social Democrats "wanted to show clearly what they would do if they could govern alone." After all, the FDP is operating the same way.

FRG Minister of the Interior Gerhard Baum does not seem to be very concerned either: "They know exactly what is feasible and what is not going to work."

Whether the Bonn coalition will continue to wither after Munich or whether it will blossom once again, will essentially depend on Helmut Schmidt. Will the chancellor succeed in conducting the 1983 budget negotiations--beginning in June--in such a manner that the coalition climate will not be poisoned by threats of resignation and questions of confidence? Will he succeed in realizing the party-congress slogan, "We, the Social Democrats, must come together," or will it become a propaganda slogan?

There is a great risk that Schmidt will not keep the Munich peace. While the party congress was still in progress, the chancellor violated his own rule of discipline and attacked Oskar Lafontaine and Erhard Eppler, critics of the NATO resolution, in such a manner that it resulted in a big argument.

If they and the peace movement succeeded in negotiating a unilateral elimination of the new medium-range missile from the FRG, then, according to Schmidt,

"the Soviet Union would have reached its most important goal; and you would not have reduced the possibility of a nuclear war; but it may well be accompanied by a severe repercussion in domestic policies and within the Atlantic Alliance."

Schmidt's outburst spoiled the mood thoroughly. Harry Ristock, a leftist from Berlin: "A sewer worker can do that but not the chancellor and deputy chairman of the party." Hamburg's Klaus von Dohnanyi: "Totally unnecessary."

Christoph Zoepel, minister in North Rhine-Westphalia: "One sentence like that can destroy the entire party congress. It is the dilemma of this great statesman."

During the night before Friday, dozens of comrades asked the chancellor to make a clarifying statement before the conclusion of the party congress. Schmidt followed the advice: It was not his intention, he announced once again on Friday, to imply that the "serious spokesmen" of the peace movement were serving the interests of the Soviet Union. Eppler remained bitter: "It was not a slip of the tongue; he was very much himself."

It is probably too late for him to change. At times he lacks perception for the need of harmony among party members. At times he is unaware of what is necessary or possible politically.

Necessary changes in the cabinet, for instance, were postponed for weeks; then he angered his colleagues in the party and in the parliamentary group with his plans. After Minister of Finance Matthoefer had announced his resignation in Munich, Schmidt gave the impression that he wanted to replace him with Manfred Lahnstein, the chief of the chancellory.

Schmidt's reasons: Lahnstein's profound knowledge of international monetary policies, his knowledge of languages and his ability to get things done, make this official better qualified than any of the other candidates. Furthermore, he feels that Lahnstein is best equipped when it comes to winning the contest with FDP Minister of Economics Lambsdorff.

The parliamentarians were furious. Nominating an official without a Bundestag mandate to the office of minister of finance is a disregard of the legislature. Peter Conradi: "There will be trouble."

When looking at the Social Democrat Lahnstein, the socialists see a guarantee that their econopolitical concepts will land in the wastepaper basket. Only a few weeks ago, the market economist Lahnstein had praised the lean employment program of the coalition in a circle of intimate comrades: Even a government led by the SPD alone could not have thought of anything better, the candidate claimed.

Lahnstein's opponents could benefit from the fact that Bonn's public prosecutor's office is still active behind the scenes, investigating present officeholders (Lambsdorff), continuing officeholders (Matthoefer) and designated ministers (Lahnstein); Franzbruno Eulencamp, head of the public prosecutor's

office in Bonn, is the only one who can determine how long the three gentlemen will have to live with uncertainty, whether proceedings against them for tax evasion or accepting special favors will be discontinued or lead to indictments.

As a result, Matthoefer--who is not in very good health--must not leave his cabinet post; it could have the appearance of admission of guilt and weaken Lambsdorff's position. Genscher wants to keep the minister for economics in office as long as possible. Consequence: Matthoefer is to remain in the cabinet, perhaps as minister of the unimportant Ministry for Post.

Of the three accused persons, Lahnstein has to date been the only one able to get a hearing at the prosecutor's office. In the process he found out a few details about the accusations: According to documents secured at the Flick Concern, the state secretary, who was one of the people in charge of making a decision on tax breaks for the concern amounting to approximately DM 840 million, had accepted complimentary treatment during a stroll through the old city of Duesseldorf.

The investigators noticed the large amounts on the alleged expense account. Lahnstein himself was not sure about the date he had put on it. According to his appointment calendar, he was in Bonn preparing for an official trip to Paris with his assistants at the time of the alleged tour of bars in spring of 1980.

The public prosecutor continued by saying that Lahnstein's change from state secretary to minister of finance in the chancellory was worth a confidential report to the leadership of the Flick Concern. And neither Lahnstein nor Schmidt knows whether the investigators have any additional information.

Anyway, it is possible that the public prosecutors will have a part in the change of the cabinet, which has been intended as a new beginning for the coalition.

8991

CSO: 3103/427

ANALYSIS OF CAUSES, REMEDIES FOR SPD'S LOSS OF VOTERS

Bonn VORWAERTS in German 22 Apr 82 pp 23-24

[Article by Bernd Schoppe: "Why Are Its Voters Deserting the SPD? Political Action Demanded. Ability to Form Majority Requires Capacity for Integration"]

[Text] Election analyses show: the SPD can only prevent voters switching to the CDU/CSU by sharpening its Social Democrat profile, by better public relations and by motivating its supporters.

In looking at recent election and public opinion poll results, too many people forget how extraordinary the fact is that a country, so basically conservative as the FRG, has been governed for 13 years by an administration headed by the Social Democrats. This is not something that can be taken for granted and it is all the more astonishing in light of the deep structural changes that have taken place in all industrialized societies during its tenure, changes that continue to take place and are, for many people, associated with a heightening of individual uncertainties.

In no other industrialized Western country has any single government been able to survive these social upheavals--with the sole exception of the FRG under Social Democrat rule. This point should not be interpreted so as to make light of the present situation but, instead, serve to put things into perspective and to prevent illusionary expectations.

Voter Loyalty Frequently Overestimated

Social Democrats frequently make the mistake of overestimating the loyalty of many voters to the SPD and of underestimating the relative stability of conservative (anti-SPD) loyalists. This is the only way that the widespread SPD disappointment at the election results of 1980 can be understood, at a time when many of them were already dreaming of an absolute majority. If we look back at the Bundestag elections results since 1953, a consistently stable conservative voter potential, at the fairly high level of between 45 and 50 percent, can be observed.

The two worst election results for the CDU/CSU occurred under what were, for the Union, the worst possible circumstances--a "cold coup" (no confidence motion) against the government had been undertaken by them, leading to a broadly based

emotional response of solidarity behind the social-liberal government. The result in 1980 was the reaction of voters to Franz Josef Strauss. But even under these extremely unfavorable circumstances, the Union still managed to attract some 45 percent of the electorate.

The CDU and the CSU can thus count on a relatively constant conservative voter potential, which it only needs to stabilize and mobilize. The SPD, on the other hand, is regularly faced with the far more difficult problem of having constantly to attract new voter groups who do not belong to the ranks of the "regulars" in order to attain a majority.

For the regulars alone are too few to assure a majority: only 27 to 28 percent of the electorate are SPD regulars, in the sense that they have always voted SPD in the Bundestag elections and see no reason to change their voting behaviors. This is why it is vastly more difficult to motivate and to mobilize these SPD supporters than is the case among the CSU/CSU loyalists. The result is that the SPD must take pains to present a political platform that is attractive to both their party regulars and to new groups, if it wants to be able to form a majority.

In 1972 it was a platform primarily oriented to reform, affording many people the prospects of upward social mobility as well as the party's Ostpolitik, which attracted in large measure women voters, young people and upwardly mobile people to the party. But it was not only the substance of these policies, but their presentation and their implementation that was responsible for success: the government used the inherent advantage of every incumbent government as against the opposition by itself picking the issues and making itself heard everywhere (especially in the media) on the subjects (particularly in regard to Ostpolitik). The opposition did not shrink from using provocative phrases such as "socialism," "reform binge," "egalitarianism," "sellout of national interests," while the SPD, instead of backing off, picked up these challenges and turned them to their own account.

During the last 3 weeks of the 1976 campaign the peace theme ("Vote for Peace") prevented a last minute victory of the CDU/CSU.

In 1980 Franz Josef Strauss was the cause of both good and bad luck for the SPD: good luck because his candidacy practically assured the election victory of the coalition; bad luck because many people among the SPD and its followers were counting on Strauss's negative impact. The development of politically substantive perspectives was neglected.

After the election, the SPD and the social-liberal government had to pay a bitter price for this neglect: political perspectives, with which voters of various persuasions could be attracted, were lacking. And it was certainly no accident that the SPD and the government in general has had to count the most serious losses among the electorate since the Bundestag elections of 1980: the SPD has lost about one-fifth of its 1980 voting strength.

Heaviest Losses Among Young Voters

The heaviest losses are recorded among young voters aged 18 to 24 (down from 51 percent in the fall of 1980 to 33 percent at the end of 1981) and among those in school or vocational training (from 52 percent down to 28 percent). This group which had always been a mainstay in the SPD's good election showings since 1972, is deserting the SPD in droves.

This certainly can be explained in different ways. But it is definitely a signal when almost 40 percent of young voters under 25 years no longer trusts any of the major parties to understand the problems of young people or to provide new role models.

Even among working people the SPD has had to accept substantial losses, especially since 1980--these losses being recorded clear across all groups of wage-earners, though these losses are least among voters from blue collar and skilled workers families. This, however, can be small comfort since an SPD platform capable of generating a majority has to take account of social and demographic changes in the society, marked by a decrease in the percentage of production workers in the work force and a corresponding rise in the number of people employed in the service sector. It is among the latter group that the SPD's heaviest losses among wage-earners have been registered.

This catalog of losses indicates that the SPD is being abandoned by a very wide variety of groups. The conclusion is evident: a differentiation in terms of significant social groups within our society, while it may aid in finding an identity for the party, will certainly limit, on the other hand, the opportunity to create a majority and could result in the SPD becoming a 30 percent party. If the SPD wants to attract a majority of the voters, then it cannot count on blue collar votes alone but must instead develop a platform which is both attractive and credible to the growing number of technocrats and young people.

There is, in this connection, little profit in playing off the groups which have abandoned the SPD against each other on a pattern such as: on the one side blue collar people who have migrated to the CDU/CSU and on the other those non-employed persons who have withdrawn from the work force and have shifted to the "Greens."

Empirical studies undertaken over a fairly long span of time, dealing with SPD desertions since 1980, show that such a division is not possible: of those who voted for the SPD in the Bundestag elections of 1980 and have since crossed over to the CDU, some 63 percent are employed, but so are 56 percent of the SPD voters who switched to the Greens. Every fourth SPD voter who has crossed over to the CDU/CSU is a worker, but one in five of SPD crossovers to the Greens is also a worker. And finally, trade union members are in fact the most heavily represented among SPD crossovers to the Greens.

These examples also demonstrate that traditional socio-demographic categories are increasingly less reliable for predicting political attitudes and behaviors. There is less and less evidence of a homogeneous consciousness among "young people" or "old-timers," "blue collar workers" or "civil servants." The frequently cited shifting of values cuts clear through the various social groupings.

Criticism leveled at an industrial society based upon division of labor and an increasing orientation to non-material values is not to be found exclusively among youthful "dropouts," but also among the majority of employed youth and--though not to the same degree--among older working people.

The Need of Many Voters for Harmony Upset

It is true: the attempt to attract various groups back to the SPD poses different demands now than at the beginning of the 1970's. Not only because the political environment is different or because the younger generation differs in structure and consciousness from that of the early 1970's. Such changes cannot be used as arguments against efforts at integration. It still holds true for the 1980's: the capacity to gain a majority assumes a capacity for integration.

There are numerous explanations accounting for its voters deserting the SPD. One reason usually given is the disagreements within the party. While it is true that the voters in 1981 are making harder judgments on the SPD as a fragmented party than they were in 1980, still, it has always been the case that the SPD was looked upon as a "closed ranks" party during national elections. This has always been a phenomenon attendant upon the intensifying polarisation with respect to the opposition during Bundestag elections.

But internal party controversies have always existed within the SPD. Even preceding the greatest election success of the SPD in 1972, there were bitter disputes at the party governance congress in 1971. And there were sharp disagreements on policy principles and energy policy before the elections of 1976 and 1980. Certainly such disputes worked to disturb the need that many voters felt for harmony, yet they did not lead to such serious losses among the potential electorate as were evidenced in 1981.

One thing that has certainly changed since earlier years is the growing failure to abide by the party's resolutions: resolutions such as support of the NATO double decision as well as the energy program linking the construction of additional nuclear reactors to clarification of the question of nuclear waste disposal have been enacted by clear majorities in each case, only to be followed by members of the party making it clear, by word and deed, how little they feel themselves bound by such resolutions. This has had a much more negative impact than heated discussions. There was no way that such disputes could be side-tracked, even though many people wanted them to be. For it was not just individuals primarily obsessed with making their points heard who brought about these controversies--although such people exist at all levels and across the whole spectrum of the party.

The increasing polarization of discussion has primarily objective causes: for example, the continual development of new technologies that pose a danger to human life; the ever intensifying conflicts over distribution of income that necessarily accompanies declining growth rates--all of this leads to polarizations which will make themselves felt in a people's party, if it is deserving of such a title.

No, the heated inner-party discussions are not the new factor which has surfaced since the fall of 1980, leading to such serious losses; it is far more likely to be the growing ineffectiveness of the party's efforts to create a consensus. The causes of the losses can be more clearly seen when we determine that since

1980--parallel to the SPD's heavy losses--public confidence in the government's capacity to solve political problems has been drastically diminished and the image of the SPD in the eyes of the voters has suffered serious damage.

Since the end of 1980 a far harsher judgment by the voters concerning the government's "competence in dealing with problems" has been registered--and in all areas of politics (with the exception of efforts to guarantee peace). This is what makes the present situation different, for example, from that of 1972, when the government was accorded more confidence in its capacities to deal with problems in all areas than was the opposition. Today this is no longer the case --and in view of the government's apparent incapacity to act over a long stretch of the summer of 1981, it is no surprise.

The priority that the voters place upon the capacity for political decisions can be seen from just one example: at the beginning of this year the government and the SPD were being judged more favorably than they had been in the immediately preceding months. What had occurred was the government's decisive posture at the height of the crisis in Poland, when it steadfastly maintained its own position despite domestic and foreign criticism. Forthright political action will always be respected by the voters.

What is surprising is the fact that the opposition has nevertheless been unable to define its own substantive position such that it would be trusted by significantly more voters than ever before to be able to resolve problems that must be faced. The result of this general dissatisfaction is that more and more voters do not trust any government to be able to deal with pressing problems.

If we add to these the voters who perceive no difference between the government and the opposition and as a result assume either one of them to be equally capable of dealing with problems, then we can say: around half of all voters, looking at any important political issue, either share in a widespread feeling of helplessness or that they can no longer see any clear distinctions between the government and the opposition.

However, if the voters increasingly see fewer differences between political groups, then their inhibitions at switching the party of their choice will also diminish.

Social Democrat Profile: Negative Reports

What this means for the SPD is that it must project a clearer Social Democratic profile than it has in the past, that it must publicize specific Social Democrat positions more vigorously than it does now, must mobilize its own supporters and thus set up barriers to prevent a switch to the CDU/CSU.

How much of what had been a clear Social Democrat image has been lost is shown from recent studies: there is a large rise in the percentage of those voters convinced that a number of positive characteristics that once marked the SPD are now no longer found to the same degree. This opinion is shared by about 15 percent of all potential SPD voters.

This marked loss of image cuts through all age and occupation groups with one exception: skilled workers are relatively reserved in their criticism of their party and form the most stable element among working people.

The party cannot be indifferent to the fact that increasing numbers of voters --including blue collar workers--see a shift on the part of the SPD away from its character as a people's party and from a representation of working people's interest to one which speaks more strongly for the interests of economic powers.

All Social Democrats holding responsible positions in the party or in the government must take thought to the fact that while the SPD does come off fairly well in terms of professional competence ("good experts and specialists in its ranks") and sensitivity to political problems ("a party that knows what unemployment means for the unemployed and their families"), it falls down when judged on the score of its effectiveness and its capacity for political action.

And this, for voters, is apparently the decisive point: their primary demand upon their political leaders is for confident and decisive action.

9878

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FDP, SPD BECOMING FURTHER ESTRANGED IN HESSE

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 10 May 82 pp 41-43

[Article: "Four Point Some--FDP in Hesse Is Paving the Way for What Might Follow in Bonn in the Fall--the End of the SPD-FDP Coalition"]

[Text] Whenever Hesse Minister-President Holger Boerner has something to say to his FDP economics minister, Klaus-Juergen Hoffie, he now uses the mails.

Instructions from the Office of the Minister-President are given in writing, the two men avoid each other in performing their governmental duties, and in the cabinet meetings their contact is limited to the obligatory polite greeting.

Regarding the further development of the Biblis nuclear power plant, the Social Democrat wrote abruptly to his "dear colleague," he should kindly "take further steps in these proceedings in close coordination with me."

In his eagerness to inaugurate the third reactor block as quickly as possible, the economics minister evidently had gone too far. While Hoffie intended to authorize the first construction sector of block C some months ago, the area planners at the SPD-headed Ministry of the Environment by last week had still not taken a stand on the matter.

The minister-president, said Hoffie criticizing Boerner's attitude, is erecting "artificial political obstacles" in the way of Biblis. Boerner, in turn, thought his economics minister was acting with undue haste. Through an immediate partial authorization, he said, Hoffie was creating no jobs but "at best an employment program for lawyers." It is clear where the two fighting members of the cabinet stand. The Free Democrat, urged on by his party, who has been pressing for a more robust energy policy, wants to "avoid any kind of clouding" of the fact that the FDP and the CDU in Hesse in many of their program statements "agree to a quite far-reaching extent."

Boerner, on the other hand, wants to maintain the last SPD-FDP Land coalition, without which, because of a two-thirds majority of the CDU/DSU-led Laender, it would hardly be possible to continue governing in Bonn. And after the rows at the Runway West in Frankfurt and the resistance against a reprocessing installation in Northern Hesse, he cannot afford any new trouble over Biblis before the Landtag elections in the fall.

According to FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, the dispute over Biblis C, for months the most striking point of conflict between the partners in Wiesbaden, is gradually fermenting into an "election campaign mold that can be shaped any way one likes." Loyal supporters of the Hesse alliance suspect that with this argument the Free Democrats are paving the way in Hesse for what possibly is supposed to follow in Bonn--the end of the SPD-FDP government.

The Liberals in Hesse (6.6 percent of the vote in 1978), no less than those in Bonn, are afraid of being caught in the downward trend of the Social Democrats. Thus the decision by the FDP delegates concerning a stand on the question of the coalition, to be made at a special party congress on 17 June, will be determined primarily by the consideration as to whether the chances of remaining in the Landtag will be increased by keeping the matter open or even turning toward Dregger's CDU.

No one wants to guarantee that a change in partners is the sure way. "However we may twist or turn," prophesies FDP Landtag Deputy Eberhard Weghorn, who wants to stick to the SPD-FDP coalition, "in the end we will have 5.2 or 4 point some percent."

Until then the Liberals are not missing any opportunity to beat the already groggy minister-president over the head.

After having been praised as fair and understanding for years, picture book Social Democrat Boerner suddenly no longer appeared reliable either to FDP Land chairman and Minister of the Interior Ekkehard Gries when after the debacle of the Social Democrats in the Lower Saxony elections and before the Munich SPD party congress he submitted to his comrades a program proposal for "modernizing the economy and raising the quality of life" in order to "help the SPD to find its identity again."

Boerner's memorandum concerning labor market policy, which provides larger taxes for people earning a good living, more redistribution and a greater role for government, according to Gies, "cannot be implemented with the Liberals' cooperation in Hesse, anyway, and not at a national level either." And unless the SPD overcomes its internal differences, he said, it will "cease being a partner that can be taken seriously." The Free Democrat added: "We don't go in for suicide."

The fact that Boerner, of all people, as a socially oriented growth politician has been pressed into the role of leftist system changer is taken by the Social Democrats as proof of the fact that, politically and purely mathematical-ly, the Free Democrats are hardly giving an SPD-FDP coalition a chance after the election.

Economics minister and former public relations manager Hoffie--"a tightrope artist eager for an image," according to an SPD minister--also quickly joined the general lament.

Already before the 1978 Landtag election, Hoffie had fought against a permanent tie with the SPD; now he is being urged by the rightwing of the party to lead the way into the Christian Democratic camp.

What with a generally "positive government balance" (Gries), which also in the opinion of the FDP Land chief has led to "good results and accomplishments," it is primarily the bad relationship between Boerner and Hoffie which represents a liability for the Wiesbaden government. While Hoffie's predecessor, the murdered Economics Minister Heinz Herbert Karry, "was always someone Boerner found it easy to talk to" (according to a Hesse Liberal), now "the procedure strictly follows the pecking order"--official and from the top down.

Actually the smart economics minister has to be careful to make sure that the Bonn-tested Boerner does not trick him and get the better of him in the election campaign. In the view of Wiesbaden government officials, the first authorization for a partial inauguration drafted by Hoffie's ministry and recently submitted to the other ministers concerned for signing off on it was drafted far too sloppily. They discovered 28 vulnerable shortcomings which might enable the opponents of nuclear power to fight the construction of Biblis C in the administrative courts.

For example, they noted, the scope of the authorization is "unclear," and the objections to the project have been taken into account "only very selectively" in the 202-page draft.

Even if the minister-president and his economics minister should agree on the partial authorization, yet another coalition dispute is threatening. Boerner does not want to approve immediate implementation, but immediate utilization of the authorization, Hoffie's ministry has made it known, makes possible an "advance concession vis-a-vis the CDU."

8790

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BRIEFS

YOUTH ORGANIZATION DEFECTION--The youth and student organizations in the Liberal People's Party are planning to leave that party. The joint administrations of these organizations presented the technical preparations for the separation at their meeting on 3 April. The final decisions are to be made at the joint conference to be held in Pori during July. The leaders of the youth and student organizations averred at an informational session during the 3 April meeting that the unification of the Liberal People's Party with the Center Party was not the most important reason for seeking the separation. It merely speeded the process. Nonetheless, Chairman Paavo Vayrynen and Liberal People's Party Chairman Jaakko Itala received a telegram saying, "Thanks for the invitation, but we are ideologically debarred." The organizations see the political and ideological differences of opinion as the primary reason for the separation, differences that are apparent for instance in the revision of the party's constitution. The news release of the organizations states: "Truly, there are few uniting factors between the Liberal People's Party form of liberalism and the youth liberal movement." The leaders of the organizations feel that after the decision to separate, the liberal youth organizations will continue to operate under their former titles, without a sponsoring political party. The youth and student organizations affiliated with the Liberal People's Party have between 6,000 and 8,000 members, according to their own report. These organizations are opposed to the idea of establishing a new liberal party. According to Chairman Jaakko Itala of the Liberal People's Party, this is a matter that has long awaited resolution. He feels that the leadership of the Youth League has adopted a radical form of liberalism that is in deviation from the steadfast policy of his party. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 4 Apr 82 p 3] 5955

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ROLE OF PSF-PCF TIES, OPPOSITION CLUBS EXAMINED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 1-2 Mar 82

[Articles by Pierre Thibon]

[1 Mar 82 p 2]

[Text] The new majority born of the elections of May and June last year has not yet become completely used to the idea that it is in fact a majority. Not that they sin through an excess of self-deprecation or through exaggerated discretion about the political-administrative exploitation of their success: jubilant exultation and the dispensing of jobs to right-thinking people are very common traits in politics, and the Socialists are turning out not to be the least gifted in this area. But being in the opposition for 23 years has left them with certain habits and reflexes, and the majority have not yet realized that it has become responsible, along with the government, for the management of the country.

This sometimes results in a strange feeling: The Socialists go around screaming in all their speeches every Sunday: "We won, we won"; they vote, sometimes reluctantly, for everything the government asks for, but at the same time they seem to consider that the policy fashioned at the Elysee Palace and at Matignon is something which is totally foreign to them, which does not concern them, and for which they cannot assume responsibility. There is some external solidarity (toward the opposition), but one does not get the feeling of profound internal solidarity between the portion of the majority that is in charge of the executive power, and the portion that sits in the assemblies.

As we said, this comes in part from the persistence of reflexes developed while in the opposition. It is also due to several other factors, the main one being that the majority is not united.

It is clear that the Socialist Party completely overwhelms its non-communist allies of the left. The PSU [Unified Socialist Party] more and more resembles a thought or word mill that operates only in a closed circuit, whereas a few years ago it had contributed to providing new ideas to the PS and had been an intellectual spur for the Left as a whole. As for the MRG [Movement

of Radical Leftists, its very existence is being questioned by several of its own representatives, who would rather ensure their political future by integration into the Socialist Party than by cultivation of a doctrinal difference which no longer has any means of expression: Mr Crepeau's presidential campaign was carried out along themes of the "Small and Medium-Size Businesses" type, with strong reservations if not outright hostility toward nationalization. He is now a minister in a government which has nationalized about one-third of all industry. This is to say that the credibility of the MRG as an autonomous political entity is reduced to about zero from the ideological standpoint, and is maintained only because it offers the possibility of varying the labeling of the Socialist merchandise in a few electoral districts of the Southwest.

On the other hand, relations between the Socialist Party and the Communist Party continue to play a primary role in the behavior of the main party of the majority. There are, in fact, a whole series of often contradictory reactions which are important in the life of this couple.

Basically, the Socialist Party continues to maintain a profound, almost organic, distrust for the Communist Party, since historically the Socialist Party had its origin in the refusal of the minority to accept the dictatorial rules imposed by Lenin at the Congress of Tours. But from the common pool of suspicion toward the Communist Party, analyses differ as to the best way for the Socialist Party to manage its own affairs.

Last spring's victory was born in great part from the defeat of the Communist Party, but the old inferiority complex of the Socialists toward the more powerful, better organized, and more militant Communist Party was not immediately eradicated. This resulted, paradoxically, in a propensity to go overboard in the exploitation of the situation thus created and in a desire to have the Communist leaders "eat their hats." It must be added that the latter had made this vendetta unavoidable by their attitude during the presidential campaign. Once over this reflex-like initial reaction, things resumed a more political aspect.

An Inferiority Complex

Among a great majority of the members of the Socialist Party, there has always been a strong desire to see to it that the Communist Party remains within the unified left, while at the same time there is a widespread feeling that it will not stay in. As a result, they thus simultaneously attempt both firmness and conciliation toward [the Communists].

For instance, the Socialists never miss an opportunity to emphasize, particularly on the subject of Poland, the pro-Soviet attitude of the Communist Party. Thus, Mr Delanoe, the official spokesman of the Socialist Party, publicly indicated how shocked he had been by the triumphant welcome the Communist Party had given the delegate from the Polish communist party last February. He took advantage of the occasion to ask: "How can the Communist Party want to institute a pluralistic society and at the same time continue to support the system which prevails in the East?" As he concluded: "Such contradictions make the communist rhetoric much less convincing."

True enough, but then why collaborate with them; is this not also something of a contradiction? It is probably in part in order to reduce this contradiction in the eyes of public opinion that Mr Jospin, Secretary General of the Socialist Party, emphasizes constantly that "on 10 May, the French people selected the Socialist solution rather than the Communist one."

In the same vein, Mr Poperen frankly submitted the hypothesis that the electorally sectarian and suicidal attitude of the Communist Party during the spring elections could be explained by the belief held by the leaders of the Communist Party that the USSR was about to achieve some decisive successes in Europe, and that doctrinal purity therefore was more important than electoral success.

However, alongside these "hard" positions toward the Communist Party, some Socialist leaders are showing more understanding attitudes. Thus, Mr Mermaz, president of the National Assembly, takes the opposite view from Mr Poperen when he states: "I like to postulate the independence of the French Communist Party from Soviet foreign policy." Also, Mr Sarre, a member of the Center for [Socialist] Studies, Research, and Education, while pointing out the Communist Party's contradictions, hopes to convert it to democracy and convince [the party] to stay with it. Thus, in its attitude toward the Communist Party, the Socialist Party seems divided between those who could be called "missionaries" who are attempting to bring the Communist Party back to the true faith, and those who could be called the "military element," who are attempting to emphasize the contradictions within the Communist Party in order to sidetrack the PC even further. The borderline between these two tendencies is very difficult to draw.

For their part, the Communists remain as convinced as ever of the "bourgeois" nature of the Socialist Party. The confirmation at their 24th Congress of the correctness of the leadership's attitude at the time of the breakup of the Union in 1977 is additional proof.

On the political level, the Socialist Party is currently the strongest. The Communist Party therefore accepts the affronts stoically and never misses an opportunity to point out that its objective is to be a full-fledged partner--that the differences and even the divergent opinions between the two parties should not set collaboration back, and that in the end these differences can easily be overcome. Thus Mr Lajoinie, president of the Parliamentary Group, stated on 12 February: "Relations between the Communist Party and the Socialist Party have reached their cruising speed. The union has overcome the ordeal created by Poland, and the relationship can be a lasting one."

In short, on the political level, since the Communist Party feels weaker, it behaves like a boxer dodging the blows when he is not able to counter. But whereas it is dominated politically, it is maneuvering, through the CGT [the Communist-dominated labor union], to drag the Socialist Party into the social field, where it remains strong. In this area, the reduction of working hours to 39 per week without a reduction in salaries enabled it to force its partner to back off and, furthermore, to get tangled up in contradictions. In this area it scored an important psychological point. As a result, the Socialist Party, which since the partial legislative elections

of 17 January is beginning to realize that its victory of June 1981 is more fragile than it thought, tends to fall back into the kind of morbid fascination which the Communist Party has always exerted on it, and it tends to align its positions on those of the Communist Party, even when this means "dropping" its closest friends. Thus, on the question of the 39-hour week, the Socialist Party took sides against Mr Maire and the CFDT in favor of the CGT's theses.

The presence in the Elysee Palace and at Matignon of political figures rising from its ranks and distrustful of communism reduces this phenomenon, at least for now. But as soon as government policy begins to encounter failures that affect the prestige of the President and of the Prime Minister, it is to be feared that the Socialist Party, in the hope of not being overcome by the Communist Party, may be tempted to go to extremes; the Congress of Valence showed that the good conscience of the socialist militants transformed them easily enough into ayatollahs.

[2 Mar 82 p 7]

[Text] Whereas the Socialist Party is still having some difficulty realizing that it constitutes the majority, the opposition has even more trouble admitting that it lost the majority. Even now, we can hear some of its members trying to show that, in fact, the Socialist Party did not gain that many votes in 1981 as compared to the 1978 elections, and that it is the abstention of many of those who used to vote for the UDF and the RPR which explains the "pink tide" which submerged the halls of the Palais Bourbon.

The remarkable thing is that all this is true. But whether one likes it or not, abstention is one way to express an opinion. In this case, it probably meant that a large portion of the voters believed last spring that the outgoing majority was not worth the trouble of getting out to vote in order to defend it. Perhaps these voters, able to establish a comparison with the government now in place, regret this attitude. This seems probable, at least for many of them.

But all this is useless: it is very unlikely that they will be offered the opportunity to show their feelings before the normal end of the presidential term of office in 1986, and whereas the four partial legislative elections of 17 January showed a marked ebbing of the Left, and even a feeling of saturation toward it in the four districts involved, it would be rash at this time to draw conclusions from them that could be extended to the rest of the country.

This is one of the problems of the opposition: It doesn't yet know for sure whether the disenchantment which certainly exists toward the Left will continue to progress rapidly, or whether we will reach a sort of stabilization of the level of dissatisfaction which could allow the teams in place to remain until after the next elections for the National Assembly--perhaps at the price of some concessions. In other words, the opposition doesn't

yet know whether it should bet on the long term or on the short term in order to become the majority once again: it obviously hopes for the short term, but it cannot reject the other possibility.

As a result, it has taken the precaution of providing itself with parallel structures intended less to provide texts for legislative proposals to be used immediately than to work in depth and build a body of doctrine. Thus we have creation or reactivation of clubs that are not directly related to the opposition parties but are very close to them: Club 89, where one may find many friends of Mr Chirac and the RPR; Perspectives and Realities Club, whose origin and tendencies are Giscardian in nature; and other more "ecumenical" clubs in which proponents of various schools of economic liberalism militate and which can serve as breeding grounds of men and ideas for the various components of the old majority: Club of the Clock, Future and Liberties, Committee for Republican Action, Solidarity and Liberty, etc.

The proliferation of such clubs seems to indicate that they correspond to a need; therefore they are not necessarily a sign of the decline of the traditional political parties, but rather they herald a sort of ideological reseeding of these parties which had sometimes abdicated, in favor of the ruling party, their functions of proposition and protestation and were slowly transformed into simple electoral machines.

Toward the end of the Fourth Republic and at the beginning of the Fifth, the Left had experienced similar phenomena: the Jacobin Club, the Montagnard Club, not to mention the Jean Moulin Club, which is a little apart from the others even though it sometimes played a decisive political role.

RPR: Everything Is Going Smoothly

On a more immediate level, the component groups of the former majority are now trying to patch up their differences and resolve their quarrels. It is sometimes difficult, and from the various reactions and attitudes it is obvious that the dispute between the Giscardiens and the Gaullists has perhaps been resolved on the political level but not quite yet on the emotional level.

Obviously, the RPR is in the best position to get such problems pushed into the background. The Giscardiens have always been in the minority in the RPR, and that was through a legitimate reflex, or even through simple career concerns.

The effect disappeared along with the cause.

Currently, therefore, nobody is in a position, even if they wanted to be, to question Mr Jacques Chirac's leadership of this group. Since it is now accepted that in order to play an active role a party must have presidential material as its leader, the mayor of Paris seems to stand no risk of any of his companions disputing his position--assuming that they would even want to do so; the other potential presidential candidates in the RPR (Chaban-Delmas, Couve de Murville, Mesmer, Guichard, etc.) seem too old to figure validly in the race.

Furthermore, the latest polls show that people seem to think Mr Jacques Chirac is far ahead of the other potential leaders in the opposition: Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Raymond Barre. This favorable evaluation of Mr Chirac therefore contributes to placing the RPR, which also has the strongest and the best tuned organizational structures of any of its partners, in a position of leadership in the opposition. For instance, social-professional groups which consider themselves bullied and injured by government decisions--farmers, middle management, liberal professions, small and medium-size businesses, etc.--are tempted to turn toward [the RPR] for support.

However, toughness is not a sufficient characteristic in a militant group to protect it against all risks of internal crisis. The parliamentary group, from which many young members became separated in the upheaval of the spring of 1981, now includes a large proportion of "elders (they held the safest electoral districts) who hold a condescending attitude toward the base and often are not inclined to further any cause other than their own. Until now, however, there have been no serious clashes between these two components of the Chirac movement, and from the outside, everything seems to be going smoothly.

UDF: Personality Clashes

It is not the same within the UDF, and for a very good reason: while the RPR is a unified political group, the UDF has never been anything other than a confederacy, even a cartel, of groups which have all maintained their own structures: the Republican Party; Centrists of the CDS; Valoisien Radicals. The only true binder of these groups was Mr Giscard d'Estaing, the president who wanted to have available a group capable of balancing the RPR. With Mr Giscard d'Estaing defeated, each of the component groups clearly tends to take back its own freedom.

This is particularly true since some sensitivity problems also point in this direction: Under Giscard d'Estaing, the Valoisien Radicals and the Centrists had often tolerated only reluctantly what they considered to be the "imperialism" of the Republican Party--which, in its dual roles as the president's party and the party with the most members in the UDF, had tended to try to impose its own viewpoints. The problem of Giscard d'Estaing himself, and of his future role, is dividing the UDF and even causing differences within the Republican Party that are exacerbated by personal rivalries. The reappearance of Mr Giscard d'Estaing on the internal political scene, through his candidacy in the local elections will no doubt contribute to bringing this problem to a head.

In any case, the EDF is currently divided between those who would like to maintain, and even strengthen, its federal-like structures in order to arrive at an amalgamation in the long run, and those who, on the contrary, would like to reinforce the autonomy of the component groups, and even blow the UDF apart in order to put the pieces back together in a different way. The former proponents are obviously to be found mostly within the Republican Party, and more particularly among the leaders who are closest to Mr Giscard d'Estaing, such as Mr d'Ornano. The latter are to be found mostly among the ranks of the Valoisien Radicals with Mr Stirn, and among the ranks of the

CDS with Mr Stasi. It is true that, as a political group, the Radicals represent almost nothing, but the idea raised by Mr Stirn of getting rid of the UDF and replacing it with two separate groups--one grouping the liberal right, and the other the left center--could be appealing to some of the Centrists.

Since the days of the MRP, the latter have always dreamed, most often in vain, of establishing bridges with the Socialist Party and of creating a third force, leaving out the Communist Party. This is pure speculation for the moment, but the problem of the UDFs adapting to a new situation (the opposition) for which it was not conceived will necessarily come up after the local elections, which are forcing a status quo for the moment--unsatisfying though this may be.

6445

CSO: 3100/526

POLITICAL

GREECE

FRG WORKING TO DEFUSE GREEK-TURKISH TENSION

NC181622 Athens TO VIMA in Greek 18 May 82 p 3

[Dispatch by Bonn correspondent V. P. Mathiopoulos]

[Text] Bonn, 17 May--Bonn has been trying to secure from Ankara a 2-year "freezing" of Turkish ambitions in the Aegean. In view of the NATO summit conference to be held here on 10 and 11 June, Germany, which is traditionally sensitive to whatever concerns the southern flank of the alliance, has been working to defuse the tension in Greek-Turkish relations.

According to a very good government source, the official German side, not only through diplomatic channels but also directly, has been working during the last 2 months to make clear to Turkey its belief that it is of primary importance that there should be an improvement in the climate of Greek-Turkish relations, so that it may be possible at some future stage to calmly proceed with the holding of a dialogue between Athens and Ankara.

In Bonn's opinion, the improvement can be achieved through a 2-year abstention from every action that could create, during this period, tension in the Aegean--both in air and on the sea.

For the Greek side no question of "moratorium" exists in view of the fact that the Greek Government has repeatedly stressed in public that Greece does not foster any claims on Turkey in the Aegean.

In any case, Bonn proceeded with this initiative when it was established that legally it is not possible to secure guarantees from all the NATO associates for Greece's eastern borders--which Greece has been demanding. From an investigation of its government legal advisers, Bonn itself has been unable to conclude whether a guarantee is possible according to the NATO charter or whether this is incompatible.

In the meantime, an authoritative source at the EEC headquarters in Brussels has provided the information that the other nine EEC associates, backed by U.S. diplomacy, have been making an effort for a meeting between the Greek and Turkish prime ministers, Papandreou and Uluu, at the sidelines of the NATO summit conference in Bonn this June. The attitude of Athens and Ankara or the conditions under which the Greek side would agree to the holding of such a meeting are not yet known.

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PASOK PAPER CRITICIZES KKE ON CAMPAIGN AGAINST GOVERNMENT

NC162045 Athens EXORMISI in Greek 16 May 82 p 12

[From the "Political Affiars" column: "About Haig's Visit"]

[Text] The demonstration of the well-known organized ability to mobilize the people's minority of the KKE because of the U.S. secretary of state's visit to our country is not irrelevant to the escalation of the open war against Pasok which was finally set off by Kharilaos Florakis in his Thessaloniki speech. The goals of this demonstration are obvious: It is aimed, in vain, at creating a wedge between the Pasok Government and the people's masses in order to hunt for marginal followers. It aims at presenting Pasok as abandoning its positions and preelection declarations, which constitute the essential part of its existence, and that Pasok is now more or less flirting with the imperialists.

However, the Pasok Government has no illusions: It knows very well what Mr Haig represents and does not wait to learn it from the KKE. With this awareness the Pasok Government invited him to have straight forward and man-to-man talks. Pasok declared before the elections its positions on the United States, NATO and foreign bases in our country and the government has made these positions clear in its policy statement before the chamber of deputies. The government places Mr Haig's visit, from which it has nothing to fear, within this framework from which it will not deviate. In the same manner, the government does not have anything to fear from any other visit by a representative of a major power, such as the USSR Council of Ministers Chairman Tikhonov and Foreign Minister Gromyko visits that may take place. What is the purpose, then, of the so-called antiimperialist lessons on the part of the KKE which, moreover, did not hesitate in its impetuous anti-Pasok campaign, to align itslef with the coarseness of the "brotherly" party of Cyprus [AKEL] and with the vulgar mudslinging at elected leader Andreas Papandreou? However, as we have said, Mr Haig is the pretext and Pasok is, wickedly, the target--a target which passes through the inadmissible attempt to present the KKE as the godfather of the 18 October people's majority and as the sole exponent of the "Greek people's concern," as noted in the statement of the [KKE] central committee's political bureau. It would be a good thing if the KKE put an end--before it is too late--to this downhill slide which in the end will only lead to the strengthening of the reactionary forces that rejoice over all of this--a fact that becomes obvious by having a look at the four-column [headlines] of the opposition press. Nothing worse could happen now from the sudden and shortsighted attempt to split the people's national concord--an essential condition to support the steps of change.

We sincerely regret that the KKE leadership, entering into an open war against us, compels us to tell some bitter truths which will certainly continue if the KKE leaders continue. At any rate, we are warning the KKE leaders that they are hoping in vain to place a wedge between the Pasok leadership and its popular basis or that we will accept receiving lessons from them about antimonopolistic and antiimperialist orthodoxy. Concerning the very question of the subject of the talks with Mr Haig, the overwhelming majority of the Greek people have unyielding confidence in the government and leader Andreas Papandreou who are calmly handling the national issues and are fully aware of their big responsibility toward the people and the nation.

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PAPER SCORES COMMUNISTS' ANTI-HAIG STANCE

NC171717 Athens ELEVTHEROTIPIA in Greek 17 May 82 p 4

[Article by Potis Paraskevopoulos: "Haig's Arrival and the Leftwing Stand"]

[Excerpts] The invitation to and arrival in Athens of U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig evoked strong reactions from the leaders of the two communist parties, the KKE and KKE-interior, and, naturally, from the newspapers which express and serve their policies. The reactions have been so strong that they even compelled, for the first time, the prime minister and Pasok chairman, Mr Andreas Papandreou, to answer them with a personal statement and openly denounce to the people these tactics by the communist leaders as immature, frivolous and irresponsible.

Commonsense is enough to convince anyone that when a government is facing problems--which, moreover, it inherited--with an adversary or an ally it choses the dialogue or the clash. However, even if it choses the clash, correct tactics dictate that it invite in advance the ally or opponent to a dialogue. This is a common position and commonsense is more than enough to understand this.

What the Greek people want today from the Pasok Government and the leaders of the communist Leftwing is that, during the critical discussions with the Americans, the country's national interests, the people's democratic freedoms and the course of the change must be defended and safeguarded.

This is the subject and the problem and not the dialogue or negotiations in Athens, Bonn or Washington. About the solutions which the Pasok Government will pursue in these issues during the negotiations, the communist parties have the right to adopt and to portray their own positions; this is both legitimate and understandable. The unreasonable thing is their allergic reaction against the government's invitation [to Haig] for the opening of a dialogue and negotiations.

However, this very reaction by the communist leftwing against the opening of a dialogue is the disturbing phenomenon about the more general stand of the Leftwing toward the Pasok Government's policy.

Things are clear. The solutions which the KKE desires to the questions of Greece's relations with the United States and NATO are not those which are

being pursued and which can be accomplished today by the Pasok Government. Aligned with the Soviet Union's foreign policy, the KKE likes to declare the Greek rift with the United States and NATO regardless of the possible consequences that this rift will have on the national and domestic development of the country's life. The KKE assessment is that such a rift will create problems for the Atlantic alliance to the benefit of the Warsaw Pact bloc, which is in accordance with its foreign policy orientations.

It is inexplicable, however, that the KKE leaders show ignorance of the recent Soviet position that violation of the Yalta agreements would be dangerous to the postwar balance in Europe. This means--and the KKE leaders know it very well--that the Soviet Union is not prepared to support Greece (and, moreover, without anything in return) in its rift with the United States and NATO.

The Pasok Government views Greece's relations with the United States and NATO from a different angle and, naturally, the solutions being pursued are different from those desired by the KKE leaders. As Mr Andreas Papandreou has declared repeatedly, the Pasok Government is pursuing such solutions to the questions in our relations with the United States and NATO that would fully safeguard our national rights and national sovereignty within the existing international and European reality.

The existence of the two opposing blocs and the domination of the two superpowers over them cannot be overlooked by any government of a European country, whether small or big. The problem today is that the existence of these blocs must not prevent social development and not hurt the national interests of their member countries, as happened in our country, for instance, both in the distant and recent past.

Therefore, it is obvious that the KKE leaders--judging from the solutions they seek to these critical matters in the country's foreign policy, which are absolutely different from those pursued by Pasok--are being led again, as also was the case in the past, into an open clash with the socialist political forces of the country. Thus, the KKE leaders are assuming serious responsibilities toward the whole of the forces of change.

One would expect that the stand of the KKE-interior leaders on these issues would be different from the stand of the KKE leaders. This is so because the assessments of the KKE-interior on the two blocs, the two superpowers and our country's stance toward them are different from the KKE assessments and are identical or close to the government's positions and assessments. However, the KKE-interior leaders hastened to virtually identify themselves with the KKE stand on Haig's arrival.

The reaction of the KKE-interior's leaders is politically inexplicable, because it clashes with both the party's political philosophy and partisan interests. The zeal of the KKE-interior leaders to ideologically and politically support the KKE reaction against the government tactics on the Greek-U.S. dialogue has really been astonishing.

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'I KATHIMERINI' ON INCONSISTENCY IN PASOK FOREIGN POLICY

NC161625 Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 16 May 82 p 9

[Editorial: "Changes in the Policy of Change"]

[Excerpts] It is unavoidable that in attempting to make and implement a responsible, realistic policy in all sectors the Papandreou Government should stumble over contradictions, over what Pasok declared in its capacity as the opposition and in its claim for authority. It is equally unavoidable that those who insist that government policy should be implemented with strict conformity to pre-election promises would be the two communist parties.

Since Pasok declared that as soon as it took over the country's administration it would..."immediately set into motion the process for total and final withdrawal from NATO and for disengagement from the Greek-U.S. agreements," it is natural that the prime minister should not be accused of inconsistency when he states he invited Haig to Athens so that he might..."be able to discuss and negotiate with the United States," without any mention in the prime minister's statement of any withdrawal from NATO or about closing the U.S. bases.

Since--in the field of finance and foreign economic relations--Pasok insisted, in its "guidelines for government policy" that "accession to the EEC would make it impossible to have any national economic and social planning for the development of Greece," the announcement of the preparation of a "5-year development plan" with the EEC as its broad economic foundation naturally causes the wrath of the KKE.

If, however, there is no veracity in the charges leveled by the two communist parties about the Pasok Government's abandonment of "political options" which directly served the move of our country from the Western to the Eastern camp, and if such protests not only fail to add to the account of the government's behavior but, on the contrary, they absolve it, then the inconsistencies and contradictions which come from within the "movement" only help to maintain doubt and uncertainty about what the government's policy actually is.

Such abandonment of positions as the ones already mentioned, however, even after the election itself, originating from the most authoritative government spokesman only goes to prove that "something is not right" within the "movement." They prove that if any necessary "change" is to succeed it must first be cleared up as to who, at long last, are the people responsible for it. It is impossible for everyone to make changes...in "change" itself.

'TO VIMA' ON U.S. GUARANTEES OF GREEK BORDER

NC141700 Athens TO VIMA in Greek 14 May 82 p 1

[Editorial: "There is No 'Dilemma': Peace Must Be Guaranteed..."--passage within slantlines denote boldface as published]

[Text] On the eve of the talks which start this weekend between Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and U.S. Secretary of State General Haig, it is not yet clear whether the U.S. leadership has reached any conclusion on the proposal to provide guarantees to our country that Turkey will respect the Greek border.

Diplomacy and mediation moves must, by tradition, be conducted far from the light of publicity in order to avoid touching upon the "national sensitivity" of the disputants. This, however, applies only so long as traces of doubt remain with respect to the Greek border.

Diplomacy and mediation moves must, by tradition, be conducted far from the light of publicity in order to avoid touching upon the "national sensitivity" of the disputants. This, however, applies only so long as traces of doubt remain with respect to the positions of the disputants.

On the part of the Greek side, however, positions have been explained by the government in a crystal clear manner and these coincide fully with the evaluations and conclusions of the Greek people: No Turkish assurances about sincere and peaceful intentions could, today, be considered sufficient. The past, together with recent provocations, daily instruct us that the threat from Turkey /will continue/ to exist despite soothing statements by its military government aimed at international diplomacy.

For U.S. policy, on the other hand, the question can be simplified from the very moment that it admits the above mentioned indisputable truth. In this way, guaranteeing the Greek border acquires the dimensions of a /moral dictate/ since in this way not only does it guarantee the just position of a country but--and perhaps more important--it protects /peace/ itself.

If we are to have peace in the Aegean--meaning stable and not questionable peace as is the present one--the solution requires only one prerequisite: neutralization of Turkey's aggressive intentions.

Even if it were to be supposed that Turkey does not have aspirations upon Greek territory, guaranteeing the Greek border would, perhaps, be unnecessary, but such guarantees would most certainly not be at the expense of Turkish territorial integrity. Since, however, Turkey does have proven expansionist trends, then guaranteeing the security of Greek territory would automatically guarantee peace.

The position of the Greek Government, rather, the positions of recent Greek Governments, has been demonstrative to what extent our country /desires/ to protect peace, but not by sacrificing its land or sea border, and not by perpetual tolerance of provocation and provocative Turkish "operational preparations."

In a few words: No aggressive initiative can be blamed against Greece. Greece, however, is fully ready to reply, even if it remains alone, to every instance of invasion or incursion upon its national territory.

This is why we believe that by coming here General Haig--and the State Department--ought to understand what most of our European allies have already understood: This is that any guarantees they offer to Greece in the Aegean will be guarantees which they will be fundamentally offering to peace.

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BRIEFS

GOVERNMENT POLICY ON AWACS RAPPED--Greece is granting the aggressive Atlantic bloc facilities for the NATOITE "flying radar" AWACS force which conduct espionage for NATO. It is not a matter of some unconfirmed reports; it is about an official statement by Deputy Defense Minister Dhrosoyiannis which is included in official documents from his ministry to the directory for parliamentary control of the chamber of deputies. This document further says that the Preveza airport has already been selected to provide facilities to the fleet of 18 E-3A aircraft, which are known as AWACS. All this has been released for publicity shortly before the visit of War Minister Haig to our country. In an interview 24 hours earlier with an Algerian newspaper that was carried by the Athens news agency, Prime Minister Papandreou carefully avoided answering a clear question on the "fate of the NATO installations in Greece which openly conduct espionage against the Arab countries." The following question justifiably arises: Is the government going to meet the representative of U.S. imperialism with such open concessions? At any rate, it is a question of bad omens for "the course" of talks with Haig. All of this causes particular concern to the Greek democratic public opinion regardless of partisan affiliation. Concern is also felt by many voters as well as members and cadres of Pasok who will manifest their opposition to Haig's visit. [From the "radical" column: "Gift to Haig"] [Text] [NC141625 Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 14 May 82 p 2]

CSO: 4621/336

NEW VVD PARLIAMENTARY LEADER NIJPELS PROFILED

Interview on Plans

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 1 May 82 pp 10-13

[Article by Rene de Bok]

[Text] Leftist politics repeatedly ridicule the VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy]: a unique collection of fossils, a bulwark of conservatism in which the ossified leadership is disturbed by any change in society. But the cold facts indicate that the label does not fit. The liberal leadership does not belong in the antique category. VVD party chairman Kamminga and parliamentary group leader Nijpels who has just been elected are together only a little bit older than the PvdA [Labor Party] political leader, Den Uyl, alone. With Nijpels appearance, the leftist criticism seems to be momentarily silenced. Instead of that: loud praises and bold speculations about a VVD-PvdA rapprochement. Delirious wishful thinking, for the moment. For how leftist is Doctoral Candidate Ed Nijpels? ELSEVIER interviews the young leader and provides a trial report in which his room for maneuver is mapped out. The initial results do not seem very encouraging for progressive dreamers who, for the sake of convenience, had considered Nijpels as a soft touch in the corner of leftist liberalism.

The faded idol of D'66 [Democrats '66], Jan Terlouw, has lost his trademark of ideal son-in-law. And Ed Nijpels, the new liberal leader, is his successor. That conviction grips you as you enter the home of the new parliamentary group leader in Bergen op Zoom. The euphoria around Nijpels expresses itself in an overwhelming, floral tribute, bottles of liquor messages and congratulations. The liberal leader is just visible in the festive decor. It is also

no wonder that Nijpels has not quite returned to reality. He is not yet at all letter perfect in his role. Shortly after his election as group leader he was going through some current problems with his predecessor Wiegel in his office in the Inner Court, when there was a knock on the door, Lubbers stuck his head in the door, whereupon Nijpels stood up to leave the room. He automatically assumed that Lubbers' colleague, Wiegel, wanted to speak, but Lubbers had adjusted faster to the new situation, "no" he said to Nijpels, "I must have you."

The undisguised truth of liberal leadership is now coming slowly into Nijpels' field of vision. And he realizes that the sounds of jubilation come not only from his own supporters. Praises are also whirling down on him from the progressive corner. The leftist oriented Netherlands assumes, for the sake of convenience, that after the Wiegel era, a flourishing period of socialist-liberal cooperation is being rung in. And Ed Nijpels is described in the visionary strategy as the bridge builder between two different ideologies. For the present, Nijpels is keeping his distance from the new unsophisticated persons in the progressive circle. The question remains: how leftist is Ed Nijpels really?

"I have had the leftist label stuck on me in a very early period. But I do not share at all that leftist-rightist classification. I don't go along with that at all. And how do they come up with leftist in my political position? Has anyone ever heard me say anything on foreign policy subjects? I think that they would consider my position fairly to the right. I give an example: together with Annelien Kappeyne, we were the only two in the VVD group who thought that the Netherlands must decide to replace nuclear weapons and station cruise missiles. If you say that to some people, they do not understand it. How can that now have a leftist meaning here and a rightist there. I think the one must wait and must classify me on the basis of what I do and say. People seem to need the leftist-rightist classification. I also understand how they come to put a leftist label on me. I think that I am open to other ideas somewhat more than other people in my party. I am used to listening a lot. I also do not have that sort of fear of other political trends which I perceive among some party members. I also do not believe that you acquire a contagious virus by talking with other political parties. Consequently, in my opinion, the leftist image developed out of that..."

[Question] Everyone is responsible for his own image.

[Answer] I am not at all dissatisfied with that image. Only I cannot classify it leftist and rightist. People who classify me as leftist usually do not see reality. It is true, the few things which we have done together with the PvdA in the field of justice are overemphasized. There were also other things. I requested a discussion on

the police strength in Dodewaard. I brought up for discussion anarchist tendencies in Amsterdam. But I have never heard a word about it or seen anything written about it. Because that does not fit in the picture, consequently it is not reported.

[Question] What is your opinion of the PvdA at this time?

[Answer] The PvdA is a ship without a rudder. On the one hand you have men like Van Thijn and Van der Stoel, reasonable ministers with good ideas, but also a man like Den Uyl, who tried until the very last moment to push through proposals with his party which were impossible. And beside him you again have a Max van den Berg who gives speeches to his ministers. Only he does not have the time. It is an example of how difficult politics is. A year ago Van den Berg was still idolized in the PvdA, now they are sawing off the chair legs under him with all due speed. It appears to me that the PvdA is taking a center course. I still do not know whether that is a serious course or is only inspired by the poor election results. Therefore, I say: it is not reasonable to ask, what must you do with this PvdA?

[Question] To the great alarm of the socialists, the VVD is continually getting more votes of young voters. What does the VVD have to offer the younger generation?

[Answer] What attracts the younger voters is the idea of freedom. The young people face a society in which everything is being gradually controlled from above. That has an oppressive effect. To that is added the fact that continually larger groups of young people are really looking at providing social benefits, they no longer consider it shameful to talk about them. They do not think it is boring to have to work hard. It now appears that the welfare state is no longer inviolable. The reality concept is maturing among youth. And the VVD joins in that.

[Question] Nijpels has the advantage of the youth, but the disadvantage of a beginner. And then it is not very inviting to follow a debater such as Wiegel in parliamentary activity.

[Answer] Yes, Wiegel...He is the best debater we have ever had in parliament. If he had aspired after a career in the theatre, he would have been a great actor. I had to conduct the discussion on the spring report an hour after my election. When I walked forward, I almost fell over my own legs. And then you should have seen Hans come there. Hans comes up, coat closed, his fingers in the coat pockets. That is in itself a theatrical gesture. I also see that lack of experience well. And I understand what is happening there. I was praised to the death. That is the attractive mechanism. But meanwhile the knives are drawn out of the sheaths, they are ready to stick them in me. The intention of the governing parties is now to undermine me as rapidly as possible in the Second Chamber.

Wiegel has no match. But they are not all so good. A man like Den Uyl is naturally a very cunning public figure, but Wim Meijen is much less so. And Lubbers has never been so brilliant as a debater. Brinkhorst loses himself in leftist-rightist conflicts. They are boring stories. That is Mr. Brinkhorst's problem, I wish him a lot of luck there. But I have no intention of discussing that seriously. When I look over the row, I am not so terribly anxious. I do not avoid debate, I think that debating to the point is the most attractive aspect of parliamentary work. I am revived completely in it.

Question Now that Wiegel's name has appeared, is it reasonable to describe Nijpels' relationship with Wiegel. Efforts were made to portray Nijpels as a faithful follower, an imitation of his master's voice, Hans Wiegel.

Answer I have never ran behind Wiegel with blinkers on. I am not that docile by nature. I was not put in the world to keep my mouth shut. There have been questions between me and Wiegel, differences of opinion which could not be resolved even in an hour. The difference of opinion was fairly strong about how to operate against the previous cabinet. When Andriessen resigned as minister of finance, we in the parliamentary group discussed the consequences interminably. A sizeable group thought that we should have also resigned from the cabinet at that time. I also belonged to that group which, moreover, was smaller each time. I admitted afterwards that we were wrong, that the policy to break away had been very unwise.

Those differences of opinion among us are of a temporary nature. We do not know any situations where a minister publicly lays the party chairman across his knee. Part of our mentality is that we do not pull the wool over each others eyes. Although the differences are great, still at a certain time the readiness exists to say: I will accept the majority point of view. And then there is no further muttering, bother and drudgery.

Question Ed Nijpels' election as group leader was due especially to the fact that he was a conciliating factor in the group. What indicates that?

Answer I think it is very difficult to find an explanation for that. I well know I have never had great conflicts in the group. Even when I took definite points of view in the past, I was on good terms with everyone. It was never a situation where people turned away from me. During those 5 years, I have really only incurred someone's wrath once. And that was from Koos Rietkerk. I had just been in the chamber a half year then and I had said something dumb on the subject of justice: I had expressed it with unusual awkwardness. Then Koos Rietkerk haranged me for half an hour. But there was not a quarrel for he was completely right.

[Question] It is not easy to act as a conciliatory factor in a group if you are one of the youngest in such a club, with here and there some group members who usually have little doubt about their own rightness.

[Answer] If I am honest, I do not mind that in the least. I like to lead the club and keep them together. I also acted as chairman in the JOVD [Freedom and Democracy Youth Organization].

[Question] Leading the VVD seems more complicated to me than leading a youth organization.

[Answer] The differences in the JOVD were a hundred times greater than in the VVD Second Chamber Group.

[Question] How much latitude do you have for political discussion in the group and where are the limits of group discipline?

[Answer] It is not something like: Nijpels word is law. I have also said that to the group. I allow everyone a great deal of freedom. Wiegel did that also. I will have to keep my eye on the matter somewhat better, because I am new here. I have also said to the group: I hope you give me the opportunity to allow that freedom. If anyone votes against increasing gasoline excise taxes, I will not lie awake about that. I have no need to sit on everyone's lip every day. If questions come up about the Ad Latjes Travel Bureau, I really do not go to take up that question with the man involved. But if it involves an important political policy, then that is my responsibility. It must not be like with the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] where the cabinet approaches problems through mutual differences of opinion or that the VVD image becomes vague outside. If, at a given moment, all people are going to walk away from that political policy, the reins must be tightened. Then there is no other solution. I think many opinions are great, but the political policy must remain clear. If it is a question of that, we all remain together. I do not want any dissidents in the group.

[Question] Nijpels mentioned the inglorious failure of Max van den Berg. Political success is sometimes of short duration.

[Answer] I think that with the VVD, it involves persons less than principles. And I advocate that. I am convinced that I will make many mistakes. I only hope I will get the time to learn from those mistakes.

Assessment of Abilities

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 1 May 82 pp 13-15

Text Capability and Experience

Ed Nijpels' capabilities extend especially to the field of leadership. He was the VVD group chairman in the Bergen op Zoom town council and led the JOVD for 3 years as rural chairman. He also acted as international secretary in the same organization. Nijpels' greatest lack of know-how is in the field of social and economic problems. His secondary school background and legal studies are insufficient to be able to debate with some authority with important party leaders such as Den Uyl or Lubbers. His work on the standing chamber committee for social affairs and employment has made him somewhat more acquainted with the hazardous operations on the periphery of the welfare state. Even Nijpels himself says about his scanty acquisitions in the field of social-economic knowledge of affairs: "I realize that my knowledge is not excessive, that certainly must be improved." His father played a dominating role in the Bergen op Zoom Town Council with his own slate for many years in succession. That background explains the political instinct with which Ed Nijpels operates today. This capacity compensates for gaps in knowledge to a considerable extent.

Score capability and experience: 59

Qualities of Character

Two circumstances have been decisive for his character. Two handicaps: stuttering and asthma. Nijpels says: "Until I was 13 years old, I could not say two sentences, not even two words, decently after each other. Besides that, I had a dreadful lot of trouble from that asthma. Until I was 17, I had one attack per month, as a result of which I spent a week at home. Asthma is a disease which you must conquer individually. They can give you tablets and syringes, which are all splendid. But that works for a half an hour. Then you are again out of breath and you must manage it yourself. I think that those handicaps have laid the basis for my personality structure." Ed Nijpels has fantastic perseverance. He prefers to face difficult situations: "Then I feel in my element."

Nijpels grew up in a strong Catholic family with an unquestionable liberal streak: "On the one hand, the Catholic values prevailed very strongly, on the other hand, a great deal of intellectual freedom was tolerated. My aversion for authoritarian solutions developed out of that." He wants to anticipate every guideline of argumentation. He is also open to the arguments of political opponents, without giving

up his own analysis outright. Nijpels' character is not free of vanity. But this is tempered by the more sober reactions in his private life.

Score qualities of character: 82

Presentation

Flair and political courage cannot be denied Nijpels. He radiates sufficient power of conviction to give his role of opposition leader the necessary credibility. He understands thoroughly he cannot beat his predecessor, Wiegel, in parliamentary theatrics. His delivery aims less at effect, he concentrates especially on eloquence with content. Still Nijpels has a well developed feeling for publicity. He has little feeling for political stunt work, but is acquainted with the media channels and knows where the journalists' sphere of interest lies. In his speaking engagements in the country and in the Second Chamber, he shows some degree of nervousness.

In debate he is alternately calm and loud. He is never overcome by emotions, without coming across as an unemotional speaker. He makes two important mistakes in his presentation. He has too much of an inclination to listen to himself while speaking. That causes him to correct himself sometimes. If he hears himself sometimes as too timid from the beginning, he has the impulse to emphasize his argument. That is too abrupt. Finally he speaks too fast, as a result swallows parts of words, which can be somewhat irritating.

Score presentation: 78

Position in the Second Chamber

Because the PvdA, D'66 and part of the CDA applauded Wiegel's departure, his successor gets the benefit of the doubt almost automatically. Nijpels is only judged favorably in that respect because the stumbling block, Wiegel, has disappeared from the chamber, not because the political opponents are convinced of Nijpels' capabilities. Beside this opportunistic evaluation, Nijpels' appearance is also accompanied by some unsophisticated evaluation. Although speculations about a future PvdA/VVD coalition are hardly taken seriously by any socialist, an illusion exists that the opposition will have less firepower under Nijpels' leadership, than was the case under Wiegel.

However, that will not last long. The scales will soon fall from the dreamer's eyes. For it then will be obvious that Nijpels will not take a chance on risky games with political opponents. The limits of the VVD political leader are also narrow. Nijpels recognizes that himself when he says: "The policy is finally not determined by the political leader, but by the party. You find in the election platform

what the party stands for. And the political leader also has to abide by that."

The parliamentary group leaders Meijer (PvdA), Brinkhorst (D'66) and Lubbers (CDA) will try especially at the beginning to get around Nijpels. But because Nijpels understands that, as a result of excessive credit with the opposition, he is risking his own reputation with the liberal party, the games will be doomed to failure.

Score position in the Second Chamber: 70

Position in His Own Party

The quick election of Nijpels as parliamentary group chairman indicates the confidence which the liberal chamber members place in their young colleague. Although both Neelie Smit-Kroes and Rudolf de Korte had aspirations for leadership, there was little disagreement about the final choice of Nijpels. He must carry out the liberalism of the eighties, he would be the conciliatory element in the group. In the VVD group, Nijpels enjoys the support of Koos Rietkerk, who will protect him from all too bold representations in the Second Chamber. Former minister of economic affairs, Gijs van Aardenne also has promised Nijpels his full support. By taking a loyal position, Nijpels succeeded rather easily in the competition to win the fraction. Nijpels made it clear that he still had much to learn and would call on the talents of his co-workers.

This "antiauthoritarian" attitude of the so much younger Nijpels has helped the somewhat older group members overcome their initial reservations. To this is added the fact that Wiegel's career provided the proof that young politicians can rapidly become the equals of older established policymakers. Finally the fact the Nijpels had Wiegels strong support was decisive for his quick election. Also in the near future, this support of Nijpels appears to be of the greatest importance. Even Wiegel has not indicated that he wants to be the oracle of Leeuwarden.

Score position in own party: 81

Position with Outside World

Many will still have difficulty for some time with the VVD's new face. The older people among the voters have difficulty in giving up current prejudices about 30 year old newcomers in politics. "Too young, too flashy, too erratic, too superficial" will still be brought up for the present in connection with Nijpels. In interest groups, there will be less difficulty in brushing away the dusty cliches. Although the employer organizations do not have any great liking for the youthful enthusiasm of the new leader, the trade union movement perceives well enough that Nijpels represents an important part of the young electorate.

Nijpels nonconformist concept of the political profession speaks in his favor. He regards the contact of the politician with the daily events in the world of work as an indispensable basic knowledge. Thus he took jobs which were directly or indirectly connected with his political work several times during his vacations. Nijpels was a prison guard in Breda, he worked on the municipal police in The Hague and he got a job in a children's home in Zeeland. He refuses to shut himself up in politics in The Hague. Therefore he still lives in Bergen op Zoom. Although he arouses opposition in some circles because of his youth, his political conduct aimed at the voters will help him forwards on the way to the top.

Average score Doctoral candidate Ed Nijpels: 73

8490
CS0: 3105/172

PCP SPOKESMAN DISCUSSES COOPERATION WITH PS

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 23 Apr 82 p 14

[Interview with Blanqui Teixeira by Rogerio Rodrigues; date and place not given]

[Text] Agreements with the PS [Socialist Party] on elections for the self-governing bodies are possible; it is too soon still for any position as to support in the presidential elections; what is happening in Poland requires understanding; the demobilization of PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] militants we are witnessing is due to the deterioration of living conditions caused by the AD [Democratic Alliance]. These, in brief, are some of the assertions made by Blanqui Teixeira, who, advocating the need for strengthened self-criticism, says calmly: "We have no acquired truths."

O JORNAL: Contrary to what has happened in recent years, the PCP and the PS will participate jointly, along with other democratic forces, this 25 April. What has changed?

Blanqui Teixeira: The 25 April commemorations will constitute a great campaign in the defense of democracy, freedom and our national interests. We believe that not only we ourselves, but other democratic forces as well, will see to it that 25 April 1982 becomes a clear expression of the will of the people and will have vast repercussions on the life of the country. This year there will again be in Lisbon a parade and an assembly. The difference is that the PS itself has committed itself to this popular mobilization.

We believe that the 25 April celebrations will spread to many new localities. Participation itself in the demonstrations and other undertakings constitutes an important apprenticeship for individuals. And this experience of unity and joint will has both a direct and an indirect influence on the various democratic factions.

We have no doubt that it was the mass movements which made a decisive contribution to the adoption of different positions on many questions by the PS.

Future Holds Answers as to Presidential Elections

[Question] The PCP is continuing to demand the resignation of this cabinet and the dissolution of the assembly. However, some press reports continue to state that if the scenario proposed by the PCP takes shape, the AD would continue to have a majority.

[Answer] Everything confirms what we have been saying: the cabinet should be dismissed, the Assembly of the Republic should be dissolved and new elections should be convoked. It is natural that almost all of the media, which are dominated by the reactionaries (where what is state controlled is concerned) are bruited it about that in new elections the AD would win again. This is a deception, like so many of the others spread abroad by the reactionaries. Naturally, we point to the creation of an honest new cabinet to direct the elections as a basic question. Under these conditions, the AD would suffer a major defeat, greater than that it experienced in December of 1980.

This has not only been evidenced by the reports we and everyone can gather from the various media. In the important intervening elections which have been held for various self-governing bodies, the AD has lost votes by sometimes very large percentages.

[Question] On 12 December 1980, you said the following to O JORNAL about the presidential elections: "We were neither sought out nor consulted about the candidacy of General Eanes. Very simply, we had to undertake a concrete analysis and in this connection we concluded that he was the only candidate capable of defeating the candidate representing the AD proposal." "We made a contribution to the triumph of Eanes without receiving anything politically in exchange, without any agreements between us."

I would ask if this situation might recur if Dr Mario Soares were to be a candidate, if he were nominated as the only candidate who could beat the right wing? Would the PCP be inclined to offer a party alternative, or on the other hand, would it adopt a position identical to that it did in connection with General Eanes?

[Answer] Normally we do not project our tactics for the future. It is not possible to answer as to what we will do at a given time in the future when we do not even know when that will be. If all proceeds normally, then it will be in 1985. Moreover, you have read a phrase it was natural for me to have used. We always seek to find concrete solutions to concrete problems. It is not our habit to speculate on the basis of situations which are sometimes almost inconceivable.

What is being postulated is a scenario I am not even sure is viable. It involves nothing concrete and therefore I cannot answer any questions about it. What concerns us is the political, economic, social and cultural situation of the country. The seriousness of the situation in all these respects is evident, as is the constant increase in this seriousness.

[Question] In one statement Alvaro Cunhal said it would be absurd for the PCP to ever support the presidential candidacy of Dr Mario Soares.

[Answer] I am not aware of that statement. But it is obvious that if I am to judge Dr Mario Soares by what he has done to date, obviously this answer could be given. Mario Soares, and one must include the PS, whose secretary general he is, has varied somewhat in his positions, but in reality and concretely, what has typified him is his agreement and even alliance with the right wing.

Agreements with PS on Self-Governing Bodies Possible

[Question] Dr Mario Soares has already said that the possibility of PS alliances with the PCP on a local and circumstantial basis has not be excluded. Have the communists already adopted a position on this matter?

[Answer] In connection with the problem of the self-governing bodies, my party is concerned about these elections and naturally is also thinking about the positions of the various political forces. Our idea is to run as candidates wherever we can. We think we might do so for all of the chambers and municipal assemblies. We also think we could definitely sponsor the presentation of APU slates in the parishes. But we are not closed to the concept of agreements. If the Socialist Party were interested in reaching agreements with us with regard to self-governing bodies, we would deal with it to see what it is the Socialist Party wants. With this in mind: not with a view to relaxing where the Socialist Party is concerned, even if this were considered on a mutual basis. But it would be possible to submit joint slates.

The Socialist Party lost 55 chambers in 1979. According to various sources, the PS itself believes it may lose more, between 10 and 25, in 1982. It is possible to reverse this trend if circumstantial agreements between us and the PS are reached. In such a case the AD would lose many dozens of chambers.

This would be a great defeat for the reactionaries. Will this interest the PS?

The PS is not an alternative, taken in isolation. It is doomed to reach an agreement if it wants to be an alternative. Either it will do so with the right wing, with the PPD [Popular Democratic Party] or the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party], and will naturally work against the Portugal of April, and will suffer, as it has, from the decline in these positions, or it will turn toward the left and reach an agreement with the PCP. Obviously, we will do everything in our power to ensure that the agreement is not with the right wing, but with the left.

Whatever temporary agreement there may be between the PS and the PCP will have a notable influence on prospects for unity. Such an agreement creates a dynamic capable of mobilizing many nonbelievers, and can win over many who turned toward the AD because they did not see any alternative they could accept.

[Question] But have there already been formal or informal contacts?

[Answer] There have already been informal contacts. If the Socialist Party is truthfully concerned today with the loss of chambers, we say that the Socialist Party can win many, but it must have a different policy. The Socialist Party, in making alliances with the right wing, seriously threatens itself but it threatens to an even greater extent democracy and the regime which was established after 25 April.

Future of the APU

[Question] It is a known fact that the MDP [Portuguese Democratic Movement] was not very pleased to see its parliamentary representation reduced to two deputies during the elections. I had asked if negotiations are planned or if it is believed that the APU [United People's Alliance]--and the Democratic Convention might be an indication of something which is about to happen--can be expanded such as to minimize, or at least to make more readily negotiable, the participation of the MDP in the APU?

[Answer] The Democratic National Convention is an undertaking carried out by a number of associations, trade unions, groups, etc, which do not have an electoral concern or effect. I do not foresee any transfer of the Democratic National Convention to the electoral field. The APU is an alliance between the PCP and the MDP but it allows and promotes participation by many independent individuals. For example, in connection with the elections for the self-governing bodies in 1979, the vast mass of the APU candidates--more than 50 percent--were neither PCP nor MDP/CDE [Democratic Electoral Commission] members. In connection with the legislative elections, the number of deputies' seats won by the APU declined in 1980. It is, moreover, necessary to take into account the independents who were elected, despite membership in the PCP parliamentary group.

[Question] Another question had to do with 1976. I know that you headed the slate earlier for Coimbra and in 1976 you were replaced by another leader.

[Answer] I was a candidate only for the constituent assembly, and for a very short time. I withdrew, for there were advantages in doing so. All of this is also related to my political tasks. In 1975 I bore the organizational responsibility for the Beiras, which I later did not have.

Understanding on Poland

[Question] You made a curious statement on 12 December 1980 in saying that "the difficulties encountered in Poland are being overcome not by steps against freedom, but on the contrary, by the expansion of these freedoms, in the direction of the increasing search by the working classes for their voice in the resolution of problems. And this is the example we can retain from what is happening in Poland." I would ask if you would subscribe now to these words, after the introduction of martial law and the proscription of Solidarity.

In the conference at the Faculty of Letters (the first public discussion, reported even in newspapers unaffiliated with the PCP) on the Polish problem, there were 16 questions, and all of them were highly critical of the position adopted by the PCP with regard to what was happening in Poland. Following the position adopted on Poland, there were some resignations or withdrawals from the PCP by certain individuals, and there was a certain controversy in the intellectual sector. As a leader of the PCP, what is your interpretation of this?

[Answer] The conviction we already had and have even more firmly now concerning Poland is that the situation was deteriorating to the point that, in December of last year, what could be foreseen was clearly counterrevolution.

Every preparation was being made with a view to an effort to overthrow the government and the regime. It is obvious that this counterrevolution was profoundly related either to the errors committed by the leaders of the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party], the ever looser links with the people's masses, or the efforts of the domestic and international reactionaries to encourage and aid the antisocialist movement in Poland. Faced with a counterrevolution which would result in a civil war, in very heavy mortality, the Polish leaders took certain steps, steps which we understood. However, the measures adopted in Poland were in response to a very serious situation. It should not be thought that our position is a closed and sectarian one. I recall that even the leaders of the capitalist countries believed then that a solution of this sort would have to be adopted.

The situation developing in December of 1981 was of extraordinary seriousness. Either the PZPR would take steps, or what would happen in Poland would be a tragedy, a tragedy for the country itself. This was an exceptional situation to which there was an exceptional response. This response, which we understood, did not exclude but rather made more necessary an analysis of the errors made and the reasons for those events. This is very important, above all for Poland, but also for the whole of the world communist and democratic movement.

Only One Party Expulsion

[Question] But the questions raised by the intellectual sector, for example, were ignored in the party press.

[Answer] The problem of Poland was particularly exploited in our country, as in others, in a major anticommunist campaign. I believe that some of the democrats who even publicly adopted a position opposing the decision of the Polish Government may one day, with a better understanding of the specific situation and greater objectivity, recognize the error into which they fell.

Much could be said about these problems. Sometimes certain democrats (it is only of them that I wish to speak, and not of the reactionaries who tried to flourish the banners of freedom in connection with the events in Poland), in an effort to set themselves apart from the communists, because of anti-communist preconceptions created and nourished by a well-orchestrated international campaign or for deeper reasons, of a class nature among others, make capital of existing situations in order to demonstrate their "independence" and their "impartiality."

I am thinking of the many people who attack the PCP, citing the "example" and the "teachings" of Mao Zedung's China, a position which is only defended today by profoundly reactionary little groups. I am thinking of the positions adopted against Vietnam because of the events in Kampuchea, when the genocide of the population of that country pursued by the "radicalists" or "Maoists" is very obvious. I am thinking of the events in Poland....

In this connection we do not believe that the party situation is in any way serious. I only know of one expulsion from the party. All expulsions are ratified by the Central Committee, and therefore I can say on this basis that

only one member of the party was expelled, a professor. There were some other party members who signed a letter saying that because of the problems in Poland, they could not continue in the party. There were no more than two or three. I do not seek to minimize the problem, because I understand perfectly well that such a complex, difficult and exceptional problem obviously causes agitation and doubt. We regard it as natural that doubts should arise, and therefore our policy has been to clarify the matter and discuss it. And I want to recall (and now I am thinking of O JORNAL, which has taken such a stand against us, in these matters) that our policy in regard to party members does not forbid discussion within the party of what one believes. Even the individual who was expelled discussed his convictions within the party. His opposition to the Central Committee positions did not date from the present or just yesterday. He had held his opinions for years, and had always discussed them freely within the party. What we do not allow is the public pursuit of a policy opposed to the party by party members. Can we have individuals opposed to the party within it? And also, what interests are served by these antiparty positions? One of the requirements for being a party member is agreement with the general guidelines and bylaws of the party. This is natural. It is true that the very interpretation of the direction of the organic guidelines is being perfected, and it is necessary to make an effort to achieve an ever better understanding of the party guidelines. But the party bylaws themselves provide that a party member cannot defend positions against the party, against its direction. I say this because, possibly due to a lack of understanding of internal party life, there are those who think that in this kingdom "what I want I can do and so order." This is not the case at all. There is great democracy within the PCP, more than in any other party in our country.

5157

CSO: 3101/34

POTENTIAL ELECTORAL GAINS OF PS ANALYZED

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 15 Apr 82 p 8

[Article by Paulo Portas]

[Text] The absolute judge in the approaching elections for the self-governing bodies at the end of this year will be the president of the republic. It seems strange, but this is nonetheless the case. The fact is the importance of these elections for the self-governing bodies, on the national political level, depends on whether the AD [Democratic Alliance] continues in power after they are held and whether or not there is a change in the leadership within the PSD [Social Democratic Party] after these elections. These are two developments in which the main determining factor is the decision General Eanes will make about the results, rather than the results themselves. The president will be the judge, because it is he who will make the choice as to whether or not to dissolve the parliament. If he does so the AD will be out of power, and Dr Balsemao probably will be as well. If he does not, the AD and Dr Balsemao may possibly continue until 1984, and General Eanes will be in serious difficulty within the left wing. This is because the president is the judge--he has in his hands the interpretation of the results of the election, and from them he can derive a whole series of applications.

The results of the elections for the self-governing bodies can never be a political law, a semidefeat or semivictory, although numerically this is possible. This means that the numbers may be reflected in ambiguous situations. They may, for example, indicate that the AD has lost a point or two, without losing too many municipalities, but the result of the numbers policy can never be ambiguous, because the president alone will choose whether the AD is defeated or not--there is no intermediary position. There may be doubt as to the results, and it is even probable that this will happen. But there will not be the slightest doubt as to who has lost and who has won after the president decides whether or not, based on this electoral data, the time has come to convoke early elections.

In principle, it would not take much for the local elections to cause serious changes in the political regime, particularly following new legislative elections convoked on that basis. In terms of Europe, this level of results from the local elections is even a typical phenomenon. It is normal that lessons should be drawn from the municipal results, that party personnel should be reviewed, that the government should be remodeled. No more than that. Much

less would it be logical to substitute the elections for the self-governing bodies for the legislative elections and the role they play. However, the elections for self-governing bodies in 1982 will be a kind of legislative elections--the left is participating because it wants a different parliament, and the same is true of the right, because it wants to retain the present one. Little or nothing of a local nature will interfere in the choice. However, this is because of the disagreement between majorities the system allows: the first electoral "round" between the parliamentary and presidential majorities since 7 December will take place in the self-governing bodies. In fact, with regard to the main goal which they are seeking, all of the groups in the presidential majority are in agreement: the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party], the PS and the president obviously have a firm desire to see the AD out of power, and they are looking for the earliest moment to effect this. The PSD and the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] are also in agreement as to the main goal for which they will struggle: to avoid losing power. As can be seen, it is a matter more of a battle between opposing majorities than of any other kind. In addition, in a perhaps incautious if courageous attitude, the Democratic Alliance has already, by various means, ascribed exactly that value to the self-governing bodies--the definition of the political power in the country, which would clearly be beyond them in a normal situation. Now, it is the AD which has the most to lose, since in any case here, the president will not resign. It is the AD which may find itself excluded from power. If the AD itself elevated the local elections to this level, it is dependent on what they indicate.

It is said that the existence of majorities which are in harmony will prevent this picture from developing. It should be noted that the majority opposed to that of the government, which has its symbol, the power to dismiss cabinets and convoke elections, will convert each election, even if only local, into a sword hanging over the government, against which it wages this battle with unequal weapons. To avoid this permanent, the government would have to spend months on end engaging in demagogic and facile popularity policies to avoid an election, repeating the same maneuver when it came to the next, and so on. Which is not in practical terms possible.

The fact that the president has in his hands the level of importance the self-governing bodies may take on does not mean that he can directly control the results of the elections. Logically, if the AD maintains its strength or increases it, it will become substantially difficult or even impossible for the president to replace it. The problem lies in the fact that although it is not at all probable that the AD will gain strength, neither is it in any way certain that the PS will, or that the AD will suffer a substantial loss. What, then, are the main axes along which the "nuances" of the results may proceed? Negative though it may be, as an acid test of the weakness of the system, which it also may be, the basic axis for the coming elections for the self-governing bodies is abstention. To a much greater extent that transfers of votes among parties, transfers of party votes to abstentions will be basic. This is because it costs nothing to presume that all of the parties and coalitions will lose votes, some more than others, the immediate result being abstention.

The margin enjoyed by the AD majority is relatively small: to say less than 40 percent is excessively risky. In other words, if the AD loses 2 or 3 points, it is moving into a definitely distressing position. On the other hand, the margin of the PS is enormous, and no sane mind believes that the PS might reduce that margin significantly, in comparison to the AD, on its own merits, in the self-governing bodies elections. What is important in connection with the socialists is to know how certain and faithful its electorate is. Or, more accurately, to know how many socialists, with the PS in the opposition, will nonetheless abstain.

If the elections were held tomorrow, it is possible that the AD might stay in power, although having lost many thousands of votes. And why is this? Because it is equally probable that the PS would not only fail to gain ground, but would also lose votes thanks to abstention. This forecast would be nothing more than a repetition on a larger scale of what has gradually been happening in almost all of the intervening self-governing bodies elections of political importance. Everyone is losing, but the APU is losing the least, and because all are losing, all remain equal.

Only the elections will not be tomorrow. Perhaps for that reason, time is not working to the benefit of the AD.

The Democratic Alliance faces above all the problem of avoiding losing votes to the PS, apart from those which it will naturally lose through abstention. As to the latter, it is almost impossible to avoid this. The fact that the opposition is bad does not mean that the disillusioned will surrender and vote for the AD. The militants will do this. The others, who believe that the AD promised to change and did not change, will tend to abstain. The AD must make its reckoning then on the supposition that it is better to combat the shift of votes to the PS than to combat the inevitable abstention. Among other things because the AD, even if damaged by abstention, will have half the battle won if it can ensure that there are no transfers to the PS.

There are at least three sectors in which the AD runs a serious risk of losing votes to the PS, which risk will increase as the present government team deteriorates further. These three socioelectoral sectors are the governmental bureaucracy, the small peasantry in Alentejo and the urban bourgeoisie. Where government employees are concerned, it is known that the treatment they have been given this year has provoked profound discontent, since the loss of purchasing power has been real and serious. The number of government employees, even without multiplying by their respective families, is frightening. It remains to be added that it is not difficult to change the direction of the votes of government employees, who are subject to formal allegiance to the government and material counterfidelity to the president, if their votes coincide with one of these loyalties or come close to it. As to the small peasantry in Alentejo, a key element in the growth of the AD in 1979 and 1980, the situation could hardly be worse. It will be recalled that in the days of Sa Carneiro, the AD managed to launch a profound reform in ownership in Alentejo, or rather in the agrarian reform intervention zone, involving among other things the gradual elimination of the "trade union feudalism," which had developed there instead of "owners' feudalism," and the gradual allocation of the land to small farmers who would work it for themselves. Finally, an effort

was made to meet the known aspiration to be owner of the land one worked. It was in this social sector that the AD doubled its votes and won the deputies' seats it had not had. The government action subsequent to Sa Carneiro was simply disastrous and regressive on these vital points, to the delight of the PCP. The distribution of land has been merely symbolic, and it remains to be seen if it was not purposely misdirected in order later to destroy the guiding principle. As to the collective operations, what has been seen to date has been the solidification of built-in economic structures. The problem is specific to a given zone, and an electoral sector. The void into which the promises have fallen and the conservative policy itself will tend to orient many voters back toward the PS. Finally, the urban bourgeoisie--for example, businessmen, those in the liberal professions, journalists and their respective spheres of influence. It would be well to remember that many of them have already voted for the PS. And that their votes, because they are interested in politics, are influenced by the errors being committed, and therefore susceptible to change. There are at least two kinds of reasons leading to a discontented urban bourgeoisie: one is the deterioration of the economic situation, and the inability to develop, and the other, which divides this same bourgeoisie which would in principle be affiliated with the AD, is the narrow-minded reactionary nature in the purest sense of the term of many of the moral attitudes of the AD. Contrary to what might seem to be the case, it is easier for a lawyer or an industrialist to return to voting for the PS than for many of their clients or workers.

The main problem facing the Socialist Party is avoiding a hemorrhage of votes thanks to abstention. It is not as easy as it seems, nor should it be forgotten that since 1976 the PS has never ceased to lose voters. What cannot be claimed at present is that, with the goal of avoiding abstentions by PS voters in mind, the rapprochement between Soares and Eanes, because it seems to symbolize unification on the left, constitutes a mobilizing factor for the voter in this sector. From this point of view, the changes which have been seen work to the advantage of the PS. But on the other hand, that party will not be in the best position to win votes from the AD sector if, as everything indicates it will, it persists in obstinately conservative constitutional revision.

Will it not suffice, however, for the PS to retain a substantially equal number of its votes in order for its percentage to rise, and above all, for the AD to decline sufficiently, the victim of abstentions? If so, the president need not have any doubt about ousting the AD, without harm to himself.

5157

CSO: 3101/34

FALKLAND SITUATION COMPARED TO GIBRALTAR, CEUTA, MELILLA PROBLEMS

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 7 May 82 p 6

[Article by Luis Solana, PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] deputy for Segovia: "How Does One Say **Malvinas** in Moroccan?"]

[Text] The enthusiastic welcome given the Argentine takeover of the Falkland Islands by the right wing of Spanish public opinion inspired this commentary by Luis Solana on the parallels existing between the situation of that South Atlantic archipelago and the areas of sovereignty in Ceuta and Melilla, regarded by the Moroccan population as an integral part of their territory.

I am no expert on languages, and for this reason I would bring this matter to the attention of my readers now in case any, in his studies or travels, has found an exact translation of the word "**Malvinas**" in the popular or educated language spoken in the nearby territory of Morocco.

This arises as a result of the enthusiastic welcome many sectors of Spanish public opinion have accorded the military seizure of the **Malvinas** Islands by the Argentine Army, under the command of President Galtieri, a welcome especially notable in the most extreme right-wing circles.

I want to say that I do not like the use of force in any sector, including, logically, the international sector as well, but I am not so naive as to be unaware that the persuasiveness of force is one of the theorems in most constant use since mankind has existed. Therefore, categorical denunciation of violence is modified by my acceptance of facts (with a view to changing them).

I have said that, in Spain, there is an atmosphere of identification with Argentina's military occupation of the islands, and I believe that it is an atmosphere justifying concern. Many people (and the government is doing little to clarify its citizens' thinking) believe that the recovery of Gibraltar could be brought about by what we might call the Argentine method, and they even rail against the government and doubt its probity because it has not as yet undertaken this. It seems to me that we Spaniards can readily conclude that the **Malvinas** Islands should be Argentine and that Gibraltar should be part of Spain, but by force? This is another matter. There are some of us Spaniards here who think that this enthusiasm for the use of violence against the British defenses of Gibraltar is crazy.

According to data from the London Strategic Institute, published in the magazine EJERCITO, in Gibraltar, there are permanently assigned for its defense an infantry battalion, a detachment of military engineers, an artillery observation unit, a destroyer and a support vessel.

Even presuming that the approaches are mined, the problem thus formulated would be a military walkover for the commander in chief of the Seville Military District and his Guzman el Bueno Division. (Parenthetically, allow me a smile concerning the degree of secrecy provided on subjects of defense here, where almost everything pertaining to the capacity of all nations is sold to the public in pamphlet form.) I am saying, then, that the Gibraltar-Spanish-to-the-death operation is not complex from a military point of view. But the fact is that those who urge it ignore two aspects: that violence here would lead to an unpredictable response from the United Kingdom and the Western community, and--what I would like to stress--that someone might translate this idea into Moroccan.

Arguments in Moroccan

Has none of these enthusiastic cafe strategists and sandwich patriots considered that their thesis might also be proclaimed in Moroccan? Have they not realized that if Ceuta and Melilla are Spanish in our eyes, they are Moroccan in the view of our neighbors to the south? Have they seriously thought about what an "operation Malvinas" undertaken by the Moroccans might mean for Spain? In the Malvinas there were about 100 British soldiers, who could do little against an invasion, but in Ceuta and Melilla there are thousands of soldiers, with the means and the will to fight, and doubtless they would, if faced by foreign aggression, leave a bloody trail.

It is chilling to see how lightly the concept of violence for recovering Gibraltar is tossed around, without realizing that someone might think the same about Ceuta and Melilla. And I do not know how many deaths the seizure of Gibraltar would cause, but naturally, the same thing in Ceuta or Melilla would mean hundreds. Can one develop illusions of ways to resolve age-old problems simply by drawing a parallel between the Malvinas and Gibraltar? Great care is needed, because someone might translate this theory into other nearby languages. Spain is not a country which can make use of violence to resolve its international disputes, and the fact that the diplomatic lethargy of those who lead us today prevented them from, as a minimum, recovering Gibraltar on our entry into NATO should not lead us to conclude that the time has come to make of this enclave another Malvinas Islands situation, because there are those who, if committed to the reasoning of force, could also cause us to awake one morning with other Malvinas Islands situations opposite Cadiz and Malaga.

5157

CSO: 3110/131

ETA ACTION INTIMIDATES NUCLEAR PLANT EMPLOYEES

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 9 May 82 pp 16,17

[Article by Rosa Montero: "A Clandestine Life for the Lemoniz Technicians"]

[Text] Bilbao--Until a couple of years ago they were ordinary people. Now they live forced to hide in secrecy. The technicians at the Lemoniz plant are frightened--frightened even of saying that they are afraid. "We went there because we are workers. This is all we can say." The voice came over the telephone hesitant and nervous. "I went to work for that reason, because I am a worker and I have a family." My anonymous interlocutor repeated the same phrases over and over again with heated emphasis. All I knew about him was that he is a technician from Iberduero, and that he failed to appear at the meeting we had arranged through a contact at 4 o'clock. Now it was 5, and by telephone he explained his absence to me with obvious embarrassment. "The fact is we do not want to talk. Some of us because we are afraid of being misrepresented by the newsmen, and others because they could not say what they wanted."

It is fear. The murder of engineer Angel Pascual opened another chasm of panic at the feet of the Lemoniz technicians--a vast pit which the habit of fear--because one becomes habituated to anything--has not yet had time to fill. The same thing happened after the death of Ryan, 15 months ago now, and also which the technicians--or some of them, the most skilled--received anonymous threats from the ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] in three spates of terrifying anonymous messages--the first a few days after the murder of Ryan in February of 1981, the second in March of that year and the last the following month. It is fear, and this is a destructive feeling which alienates and sweeps away all freedom. Therefore, it is easy to understand that anonymous interlocutor seeks refuge again and again in the statement that he is "a worker," a statement which from him, a highly skilled technician, perhaps rings somewhat false, as if in reality it were a desperate argument in the search for understanding by all of the factions involved in the conflict--Iberduero, the central government, the Basque government and, naturally, the ETA itself.

For it is like being in the midst of a nightmare. The abnormality which characterizes the lives of the Lemoniz technicians becomes very evident when one tries to make contact with them. Their names, of course, are shrouded in the most absolute secrecy. And yet, up until just a couple of years ago they were normal people with friends and neighbors who doubtless knew their names and occupations. Now they have entered into forced clandestinity and a dense smokescreen seems to have been drawn over them. Their secret is carefully kept in this Basque country in which they live. It is not to no purpose that this is a land habituated for years to secrecy and whispers. Thus to reach any one of them one must make use of a whole chain of contacts, the final links in which are also nameless. And even so, the rendezvous was not kept. The technicians are understandably afraid. Even afraid to say they are afraid.

It is 9 pm, in a cafeteria in downtown Bilbao, full of people. There is a new contact who might put me in touch with a different technician. The contact tells me that yes, the man has come, but we must leave the premises, where there are too many people to provide adequate security. We go out into the night and finally I see him, huddled against a lamppost, friendly but suspicious. All three of us go to a nearby pub, conveniently empty, and as soon as we have taken seats, the technician, bashful and timid, asks to see my identification "if you don't mind."

Apart from the well-justified objections one can make to nuclear plants or that in Lemoniz, it is a fact that the personal undertaking of these men constitutes an extraordinary experience. And it is easy to imagine how amazed and disillusioned this group of high-level professionals with predictably comfortable and satisfying futures was on finding itself suddenly in the midst of a battlefield, the scene of a battle which in the final analysis is not theirs. There are in all some 200, but they are not all in similar circumstances. Some of them belong to the installation team, and they left Lemoniz when the plant was completed. Others are on the planning team and work in Iberduero, like those on the third team, those responsible for operations. These last two groups are the most affected, and within those, it is those professional workers with the greatest responsibility for whom the threat is greatest.

The situation was already uncomfortable before the Ryan affair. Lemoniz has always been the scene of conflict: picketing to block the work and strikes. Generally speaking, the technicians did not participate in these campaigns, and they were the target of insults and a certain resentment. Some pamphlets accused them of being mercenaries (it will be well to say here, to avoid oversimplification, that many of the technicians espouse a more or less progressive ideology). There was also the subject of the bombs, real or imaginary, and the resulting evacuation of the plant. But these were conflicts which could be controlled and guided. It was a matter of "paying the price" for working at Lemoniz, an annoyance and nothing more. The kidnaping and murder of Ryan was the fuse which finally opened everyone's eyes. "Because one wanted to believe that nothing would ever happen, and then..." then came this sensation of losing ground, then came panic. "After Ryan's murder," the technician said, "something very serious, which is without a doubt being repeated following the murder of Angel Pascual, happened. The fact is that all of the

institutions which favor democracy and in the final analysis depend on votes decided unanimously that it was necessary for the technicians to return to the plant so as to refuse to yield to terrorism, even though the life of another technician was in danger and even though some of these parties opposed this plant publicly. They say that this is politics and this is why we technicians do not understand this kind of decision. All we know is that it is our lives which are at stake and that under these conditions of terrorism it is impossible to work anywhere, much less in a nuclear plant, where extreme dedication is required. This is what the politicians do not understand. Obviously, they are politicians."

In those first months a rout occurred, just as has happened again now, following the second murder. At that time some technicians went to the Basque Country. Others began frenetic arrangements to change jobs. And finally, some others sent their families away and moved to a hotel, living in borrowed premises for months. The houses--those in which the anonymous ETA messages reached them--were "blown." It was necessary to move, perhaps to sell them, to take up temporary residence. The technicians asked for a referendum, and Iberduero asked that they return to work. However, the enterprise changed its attitude in the month of May 1981, and sent all those who did not want to go back to work jobs in the firm elsewhere. The work at Lemoniz was paralyzed.

Beginning Again

Six of the technicians resigned. They were fortunate, having job offers from abroad, which they accepted. "The difficult thing is those of us who want or wanted to go but do not have or did not have any job offers." Because the idea of leaving Iberduero ran through the minds of all of them. "Without a doubt, I looked for other work, like many other colleagues, although it means leaving Iberduero, an enterprise which in my view has treated us very well. What this means is going to another enterprise, if one can find one, since there are all kinds of difficulties, because of the labor situation because of a certain protectionism exercised by these enterprises over their personnel. If in addition one had to leave the Basque Country, this means leaving one's home and one's social life and all that, and if one has children this complicates matters. In a word, it means beginning again, and this is very hard."

The fact is that highly skilled technicians like these represent a kind of investment for the enterprise. Their specialties require many years of study and in some cases they have cost Iberduero as much as about 12 million pesetas. Therefore, the other domestic firms which might offer similar technical employment participate in a kind of tacit agreement--businessmen's fair play--not to employ technicians trained by the competition except on the basis of prior agreement with that enterprise. Thus the possibility of finding similar work in Spain is almost nil.

Therefore, all of these employees--except for the six lucky ones--stayed at Iberduero. They continued to live a life of an insane sort. "How do we live?" The anonymous voice on the telephone responded in exasperation. "Well, it's bad, bad. Terrified whenever you go out to buy a newspaper and see someone

with a beard watching you." And so you learn to survive the tension, the paranoia: you put a bar on the door, you alter your usual route every day, you run the faces you pass in the street, the license numbers of cars, through a useless mental computer. And someone slowing casually beside you can cause your throat to go dry, a cold sweat to break out. "Really, it is a little like living in clandestinity. It seems like fiction and one must experience it to know what it means. What was normal before becomes abnormal now--a glance from someone at a neighboring table in a restaurant--I know what it is. Because all of this can be imagined in political secrecy, as has happened at other times, but to have to do this in order to work at a nuclear plant is insane. And this has affected not only each one of us, but our families as well and our friends, to the point that conversations always center on the same subject--what is happening at the plant and with you technicians? And it is always the same, returning to the same theme, since when it was not the discussions in the Basque parliament it was the negotiations between the governments and Iberduero on the Lemoniz issue. You spend the day hearing rumors, rumors about whether some will be handed over to a management company, without being asked if they are agreeable to such a move, or if the negotiations were secret, with the suggestion that to a certain extent the ETA was in agreement with the pacts." And then, in addition, there are the various surrounding pressures because "there are technicians who live in great urban centers and others who live in small villages, and those in this latter situation find themselves deeply involved. The psychological tension is much greater, because everyone knows them, and they themselves, even if they know from whom threats might be coming, can say nothing."

Days of Fear

A number have had to go under psychiatric treatment. Many suffer from headaches and dizziness. "You go to the doctor and they tell you 'Oh, you work at Lemoniz? Well then....'" But in time, even nightmares take on aspects of normality. One adjusts to fear and seems to reconstruct a pantomime of daily action. In the past 12 months, no more anonymous messages have been received. Lemoniz was "handed over" to the Basque government and the agreements with the management society began. And, as another nameless technician said, as reported in an article by Luis Mendizabal in DIARIO VASCO, "to date the ETA has attacked neither the Basque government nor the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party]." Thus when Iberduero issued another ultimatum ordering a return to work last 23 April, the technicians agreed. "The order seemed to have come from the council of industry of the Basque government, and it was issued on a Friday, ordering a return to work the following Monday. These were days of tension and fear, yes, fear. Fear of returning because of the possibility of an attack, and if one did not return, fear of losing one's job."

On Monday, 3 May, all of the technicians except 10 reported for work in Iberduero. Two days later, Pascual was murdered. The technicians learned of this new death just as they arrived at work at about 8:30 in the morning. Many did not even enter the plant. Those who were already inside speedily and suddenly left their posts. Again there was panic, flight, fear.

After the murder of Pascual there was speculation in Basque political circles as to what this development might mean in terms of a final frontal clash between the ETAm and the PNV. Garaicoechea has said that he will take up the challenge--it is war. And in the middle, between the trenches, are the Lemoniz technicians, caught in the desolation of no man's land.

5157

CSO: 3110/131

HAIG VISIT TO TURKEY, GREECE EVALUATED

Haig Visits Turkey

NC191152 Istanbul CUMURIYET in Turkish 15 May 82 pp 1, 11

[Unattributed commentary: "Haig's Dilemma"]

[Text] To discuss and evaluate U.S. Secretary of State Haig's visit to Ankara as an isolated event would be inconclusive. This visit must be evaluated as part and parcel of the policy of the leading members of the U.S. administration toward the south-east wing of NATO and the Middle East. The Washington traffic around the Ankara-Athens axis will be intensified in the coming weeks. The subjects on the agenda are assorted. Foreign Minister Turkman has explained to journalists that Haig's visit to Ankara does not mean lending support to Turkey against Europe. A BBC commentary carried similar remarks. The fact remains that this aspect of the matter is open to speculation. Haig as well as the other U.S. administrators are facing more serious problems: they are worried over ways and means of healing the crack in the south-east wing of NATO. The NATO ministerial committee will meet in Brussels next Monday. Haig is trying to make fruitful contacts in Ankara and Athens and to keep the issues between the two countries at a specific level should he be unable to solve them.

Haig's position is a difficult one. Where does this difficulty originate? Prime Minister Papandreou is of the opinion that NATO does not protect Greece from a probable attack from Turkey. He is keeping this issue in the limelight--an issue which is both strange and contradictory since it involves giving guarantees to one member of the alliance against another. Can Washington provide Greece with such assurances? Can it thus eliminate Athens' bad temper in NATO and at least save the situation in appearance? What would Turkey's reaction be if such assurances were to be given to Greece?

Turkey has declared that it will deem Greece's arbitrary extension of territorial waters to 12 miles as a "cause for war." An assurance given to Greece by Washington would encourage Papandreou to extend Greece's territorial waters to 12 miles and this would bring Turkey face to face with a Greece enjoying the support and assurances of NATO and the United States.

Haig is facing this as well as a host of other problems in the south-east wing of NATO. The U.S. secretary of state said "I felt at home" as soon as he arrived in Ankara. Let us see how he will feel when he goes to Athens tomorrow. Because Foreign Minister Turkmen said categorically: "Turkey has no concessions to make to Athens."

Ankara, Athens Visit

NC191336 Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 17 May 82 p 4

[Commentary by Professor Fahir Armaoglu: "Ankara-Athens and Haig..."]

[Text] A firm principle of U.S. foreign policy has manifested itself once more with U.S. Secretary of State Haig's visit to Ankara. This principle is based on the practice of visiting Athens after Ankara or visiting Ankara after calling at Athens. It has always been so in times of peace and times of crisis. It looks as if it is going to be so as long as Turkey and Greece continue to form the south-east wing of NATO, because Turkey and Greece constitute an entity in the foreign policy of the United States.

Therefore, the results of Haig's visit to Ankara on 14 and 15 May should be assessed not only upon their own merits but also within the triangle of Ankara-Washington-Athens. It is, therefore, too early to judge his visit to Ankara properly before seeing the outcome of his visit to Athens.

However, a few things can be said about the talks in Ankara. First let me say that the Turkish side has attached much more importance to Haig's visit than the U.S. side. If I may say so, Haig has at times been accorded a treatment that goes beyond the usual protocol. At the seeing-off ceremony at Esenboga Airport, Foreign Minister Turkmen's speech expressed an enthusiasm that far surpassed Haig's. According to Turkmen, "The Turkish-U.S. relations have matured. Our relations are perfect." But Haig's speech did not have such a vigorous tone.

Three issues seem to have been taken up during Haig's visit: the modernization of the Turkish army, Turkish-Greek disputes and Turkey's relations with Europe.

It is understood that a satisfactory result has been obtained in the first issue. As to the Turkish-Greek relations, the United States has, as usual, staunchly supported a "dialogue" as a method of negotiations. But this concerns the method. The same thing cannot be said about the contents of the issues. For, the contents of the issues concern Athens as well. That is, Athens' attitude influences the contents. For this reason, talks in Athens assume importance.

The United States had, for some time, launched a campaign of "suggestions" if not of pressure for the purpose of preventing Turkey's ties with Europe being severed and improving its relations with it. It is now understood from Haig's words that the United States has abandoned this campaign. Instead, he

spoke of Turkey's "effective place in the preservation of stability in south-west Asia," and whether we like it or not, this reminds us of the rapid deployment force.

It is understood that the 3 1/2 hour talk Haig had with Prime Minister Papandreou in Athens has softened the atmosphere. Following these talks, Haig stated that "progress has been made in all key issues," while Papandreou said: "I am satisfied with today's talks." Now it remains to be seen how this softened atmosphere will reflect on Turkish-Greek issues and whether it will prepare a suitable ground for a Papandreou-Ulusu meeting at the NATO summit beginning of June. If this materializes, Haig's visit to Ankara will have been fortified.

CSO: 4654/320

COLUMNIST SCORES EUROPEAN MEETING IN EAST JERUSALEM

NC240828 Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 19 May 82 pp 1, 13

[Commentary by Professor Fahir Armaoglu: "An Unseemly Behavior"]

[Excerpt] We think that the best way to describe the meeting of the political committee of the Council of Europe which began in Jerusalem yesterday is as "an unseemly behavior."

This body, the consultative assembly of the Council of Europe, which, as clearly observed, believes that [it] possesses certain supreme powers and that it is above every state and organization, has sent its political committee to meet in Jerusalem, an act that is tantamount to stirring up a wasps' nest. This is like pouring oil on a fire, because, despite the fact that Israel officially annexed East Jerusalem last year, it continues to be disputed internationally. By attending such a meeting, the committee members are taking sides. This is nothing but provoking a dispute. In view of the fact that this committee is an organ of the Council of Europe, whose lofty task is to unite Europe and to create an international entity, it should play a uniting and not a disuniting role. Whereas, by holding a meeting in Jerusalem it has totally provoked division and polarization. This is contrary to the aims of the Council of Europe and it is an unseemly act on the part of the political committee.

With this meeting the political committee has caused widespread consequences which transcend the limits of the case; because of this case, more mention is made of the Council of Europe than of the political committee. It sounds as if the entire Council of Europe has recognized the annexation of East Jerusalem. In fact, no such thing has occurred. The Portuguese, Spanish, Greek, Danish and French members of the Council of Europe are not taking part in the East Jerusalem meeting. As is known, although Turkey is not a member of the political committee at the moment, it protested this decision as a member of the Council of Europe as soon as it was agreed to hold it. The situation being what it is, by holding this meeting in East Jerusalem all members of the Council of Europe appear to be involved.

This case has another aspect, too. As will be remembered, some members of the political committee continue visiting Turkey and attempting to lecture Turkey on law and democracy. However, are they now aware of the fact that they have destroyed a U.N. Security Council resolution, which is still valid, by holding this meeting in Jerusalem security council resolution 242 adopted on 22 November 1967, has not yet been revoked. This resolution demands Israel's withdrawal from the territories it has occupied. By deciding to hold a meeting in East Jerusalem the political committee seems to be indirectly approving its annexation. This meeting amounts to flouting the security council resolution. In a way, this is nothing but disrespect for the United Nations as well as for international law.

To put it briefly, no matter from what angle we look at it, the whole issue is a raw deal full of unseemly acts.

CSO: 4654/322

PAPER SUSPICIOUS OF ARMY COMMANDER'S APPOINTMENT

NC160724 Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 16 May 82 p 1

[Text] Are the reasons why Maj Gen Yeoryios Azinas has been appointed commander of the Cyprus army really due to "formality and procedural" purposes? This question has been asked by political circles, which have even expressed suspicion that President Kiprianou's sudden decision may have been dictated by other reasons and expedencies.

Specifically, the political circles have put forward the view that what has happened may be the beginning of the implementation of a well-prepared plan for which provision is made in the secret agreements--within the framework of the AKEL-Democratic Party [DIKO] minimum program--regarding the revival and reorganization of the Cyprus army for reasons which are not unrelated to the manning and in general the future and the role of the national guard. In such a case, the goal of the AKEL-DIKO cooperation would be the creation, through the Cyprus army, of a national guard antipode and of an alternative solution that would be available whenever this would be dictated by circumstances.

The same political circles have also maintained that since one of the main goals of the popular-democratic front is the penetration and finally the conquest of the security forces and particularly of the army, one should not rule out that again suddenly and for "purely formality and procedural reasons" all the Cypriot cadre of the national guard may come under the Cyprus army, in which mainland Greek officers cannot serve.

Nevertheless, the same political observers have stressed, although future developments will show how founded our fears and suspicions are due to this first action which has the Cyprus army as its goal, there are both indications and serious reasons which justify concern about AKEL's future plans for the national guard, the Cyprus army and the ministries of interior and defense.

On the other hand, government circles have maintained that the appointment of Major General Azinas was made in order to fill the post of Cyprus army commander and to make possible the promotion of other senior and junior national guard officers.

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PSF PROPOSALS FOR MILITARY COMPARED TO COMMUNIST BOOK

Paris LE FIGARO MAGAZINE in French 3-9 Apr 82 pp 88-89

[Article by Georges Rieu, former scientific attache in Moscow, in charge of research at the CNRS [National Committee for Scientific Research]: "Do the Socialists Still Want To Break Up the Army?"]

[Text] How far will the reform of the army go? For the current chief of staff of the armed forces Jeannou Lacaze, as well as for his predecessor, Gen Guy Mery, it would "break up" the army to reduce the length of national service to 6 months.... Charles Hernu, for his part, condemns those who wish to introduce "class struggle" into the national service.

"If the Kerensky government had had a single reliable regiment at its command," Lenin used to say, "the revolution would have failed." Lenin himself thus recognized it: It was the breakdown of the Russian Army that permitted the Bolsheviks to seize power in 1917. This only goes to show that "the degree of solidity of the entire state depends on the degree of solidity and the general condition of the army."

This breakdown of the Russian Army was the unrelenting task of the soviets beginning in 1902. "Order No 1" of the Petrograd Soviet (14 March 1917) gives an idea of this insidious, undermining work. Here are its principal provisions:

"In all companies, battalions, regiments, batteries, squadrons and in the different military administrative services, as well as on navy vessels, committees of soldiers should be formed which are made up of elected representatives of the above-cited units...."

"All military organizations will elect delegates to the soviet...."

"The army will be subordinate to the soviet...."

"Arms of all kinds, guns, machine guns, armored vehicles, etc., should be put under the control of the company and battalion committees. They should be placed at their disposition, and under no condition should they be handed over to the officers, even if they expressly demand it...."

"Standing to attention, the military salute, and ranks accorded to officers are abolished...."

These orders are at the beginning of a small work edited by a team of politico-military specialists of the KPD, the German Communist Party, integrated into the Red Army: "The Road to Victory. The Art of Armed Insurrection."

In the spring of 1928, one of the authors of this book, Erick Wollenberg, a science associate at the Marx-Engels Institute of Moscow and professor at the military schools for young German communists trained as "insurrection specialists," was called in by Piantisky, secretary general of the Komintern. A certain number of other persons, including army General Unsclicht, in charge of coordination between the staff of the Red Army and the Komintern, and "Ercoli," pseudonym for Togliatti, in charge of agitprop, were present at this meeting. They were asked to produce a popular work that would be capable of reaching communists as well as sympathizers wishing to have documents on the methods, tactics, and techniques of armed insurrection with a view to causing the breakdown of the armed forces of foreign countries.

The book appeared illegally in Germany in 1928, and in France in 1931, with a preface by the central committee of the Communist Party, where one can read specifically: "The immediate struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat is necessarily an armed struggle, the armed uprising of the proletarian masses who, according to the program of the Communist International, should rely on the rules of the military arts, and it assumes the existence of a military plan."

Entitled "The work of the Communist Party for the breakup of the armed forces of the ruling classes," Chapter VII of "Armed Insurrection" is written in the spirit of "Order No 1" but in even more explicit terms: "The essential objective of work in the army, the navy, and the police (or the gendarmerie) is to have the bulk of the soldiers (sailors or police) join in the common front of the proletarian class struggle; that is, to see to it that the soldiers know the slogans and objectives of the Communist Party and adopt them.

"The work of the party and of communist youth organizations for the demoralization of the bourgeois army and navy should be carried forward on two basic levels:

- a) Inside the army and the navy;
- b) Through the general work of the party as a whole outside the army; through activity on the parliamentary level in regard to military matters; and through propaganda and agitation by word of mouth and the press to popularize such and such a slogan in the army, etc. These two forms of action, action inside the army and outside it--should be closely linked under the direction of a single center, the central committee of the party.

There follows a series of concrete examples which amount to partial demands concerning the system of defense and also the material and juridical conditions of soldiers.

Why all these historical recollections?

Because this book, "Armed Insurrection," was reprinted in facsimile at Editions Maspero in 1970, and most of the partial demands found in it are practically word for word for word in a "draft outline law on carrying out national service and the rights and liberties of conscripts," registered under No 2221 at the National Assembly on 18 December 1980 and circulated on 10 February 1981!

A clarification: This draft outline law, which of course had the aim of "providing France with a credible effective defense," was presented by the 47 Socialist deputies as well as by the members of the Socialist group and its allies.

Comparison of the two texts (the text of "Armed Insurrection" is in quotation marks) is to say the least disquieting. Judge for yourself:

"Concrete demands concerning abolition of courts-martial and reduction of the period of military service."

Article 18. In peacetime, tribunals of the armed forces are eliminated and their authority will be exercised by courts of common law.

Article 5. Active service lasts for 6 months.

"Abolition of obligatory residence at the barracks."

Article 10. No requirement to be present within a military establishment can be imposed outside of service requirements.

"Formation of soldiers committees"; "right to form trade unions."

Article 12. They (the conscripts) can belong to political, trade union, confessional, professional or cultural associations of their choice and participate in their activities in civilian attire.

Article 11. They (the conscripts) can speak at public meetings or express their opinions orally or in writing without prior permission.

"Formation of mess committees elected by the soldiers."

Article 28. In each unit the conscripts will elect their representatives by secret ballot according to procedures set forth in the law. Representatives of the conscripts cannot be dismissed or transferred except in cases of serious misconduct explicitly defined in the regulations concerning general discipline.

Article 29. Representatives of the conscripts are eligible to participate in decisions relating to the life of the unit.

Article 30. At the level of each regiment or formation or unit, a mixed commission with various attributes is created wherein elected representatives of the conscripts and staff meet according to procedures fixed by decree.

Article 37. The law will implement the principle of elected representation for the higher council of the military function.

"Abolition of punishments."

Article 14. No sentence can be pronounced on a conscript, and no special obligation can be imposed on him, if such is not explicitly provided for in the regulations concerning general discipline."

"Right to subscribe to any papers."

Article 9. They (the conscripts) can, nevertheless, receive and read papers and books of their choice.

Since the victory of the left, the following have been abolished: the tribunal for state security; military justice (the headquarters of the gendarmerie and military justice has become the general headquarters of the national gendarmerie); the headquarters of military security, and, within the SDECE, of specialized commandos and detachments for operational assistance (DAO). Concerning the police in particular, we also note the abolition of laws against damage to property by demonstrators, and the elimination of quarters for higher security. And Prime Minister Pierre Mauraoy on 28 February 1982 promised us the abolition of the permanent tribunals of the armed forces.

On page 156 of "Armed Insurrection," one can read:

"This listing of partial demands can be lengthened without difficulty; only the most important have been mentioned here. These two categories of demands mentioned above should be presented not only within the army, but also outside, in parliament, at popular meetings, etc. The state of the morale of the army and the political situation at a given moment must be well known (for example, one cannot ask for the election of officers by soldiers if demoralization has already reached a certain point."

Have the Socialist deputies who presented this draft bill been taken advantage of by a communist maneuver?

The question is worth posing.

It is worth posing all the more so since the first demand figuring in the book "Armed Insurrection" is the "dismissal of mercenary armies." And a draft bill (No 509) was registered on 1 June 1978 "for the dissolution of the Foreign Legion."

This draft law was presented by the Communist deputies.

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END